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A thesis to consider whether the development of voluntary governance codes of 
practice for the registered charity sector in England and Wales has had any material 
effect on charity law.  
The thesis reviews the development of the codes since their first publication in 2005, 
and how they relate to the legal duties of charity trustees, primary legislation that 
applies to charity governance, the regulators of the registered charity sector, and 
relevant case law. It also looks forward to potential changes in the law and the codes in 
the near future. 
Good governance has been codified in the corporate sector but remains voluntary for 
charities. With public trust in charities remaining steady at a historic 2016 low point, the 
codes of practice could be a mechanism to measure and evidence good governance, and 
to provide charity trustees with certainty that they have fulfilled their duties. 
The thesis considers what amounts to governance, and how governance relates to the 
charity trustees’ legal duties and obligations. It reviews the evidence that the codes have 
been used by legislators, regulators and the judiciary. The thesis concludes that 
voluntary codes of practice have made little difference to date and suggests that the 
codes are not seen as a necessary tool for good charity governance. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction to charity governance 
The responsibility for the general control and management of the administration of a 
charity lies with its trustees.1 The powers and duties of those trustees derive from five 
sources:2 the common law relating to charities; the Charities Act 2011; the law relating 
to the charity’s legal structure; the charity’s particular constitutional instrument, and 
specific legislation relating to that particular charity or class of charities.3 
The process by which a charity trustee fulfils that duty is often referred to as 
‘governance’, a term derived from the Latin word meaning to steer or give direction, 
and now widely used in the corporate and voluntary sectors, although without a 
universally applied definition. Governance can be found in any situation where there is 
a process of governing, and a well run charity should demonstrate good governance. 
A lack of good governance will not necessarily mean that an organisation will fail, and in 
a very general sense, any failure of trustees to comply with their duties could be seen to 
be a failure of governance. Charity governance failures not only risk reputational 
damage to a particular charity, but also risk damage to the third sector and the loss of 
public confidence in the ability of organisations to fulfil their charitable aims. In research 
published in 2018, it was noted that the public’s trust in charities had remained at a 
historic low level since 2016, and that the public expected charities to have high 
standards of conduct, with transparency and accountability for what they have 
achieved; how they manage their resources, and how their actions support their 
charitable purposes.4 A method of applying and measuring good governance to the 
 
1 Charities Act 2011, s 177. 
2 William Henderson and Jonathan Fowles, Tudor on Charities (10th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2015) 776. 
3 For example, the British Museum Act 1963 relates solely to the charitable British 
Museum and the Housing Association Act 1985 relates to charitable housing 
associations. 
4 ‘Trust in Charities’ (The Charity Commission for England and Wales, 11 July 2018) 
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/trust-in-charities-2018> accessed 30 
September 2019. 
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sector would seem a valid tool to achieve and evidence the meeting of those 
expectations.  
The codification of good governance can be traced back to 1991 when the UK 
Government set up the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
in response (amongst other reasons) to the much criticised collapse of Coloroll 
corporate group and the Polly Peck consortium.5 Under its chair, Sir Adrian Cadbury, the 
Committee published its report (the Cadbury Report) in 1992.6 One of the Cadbury 
Report’s recommendations was that all boards of directors of UK listed companies 
should comply with the Committee’s Code of Best Practice, and other companies should 
aim to do so.7 If a company did not comply, it should explain why not.8 The Cadbury 
Report’s Code of Best Practice has been updated and revised many times, the current 
version being published as the UK Corporate Governance Code in July 2018.9 
The Cadbury Report included a definition of corporate governance as: 
… the system by which companies are directed and controlled. Boards of directors 
are responsible for the governance of their companies. The shareholders’ role in 
governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves 
that an appropriate governance structure is in place.10 
Although this definition of governance could apply to the charity sector, corporate 
governance is obviously (and necessarily) concerned with the relationship between the 
company’s board of directors and the company’s shareholders. Charities do not serve 
 
5 The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of the 
Committee on The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee 1992) Preface and 
para 4.60. 
6 ibid. 
7 ibid 54. 
8 ibid 54 para 2. 
9 ‘History of the UK Corporate Governance Code’ (Financial Reporting Council, 
undated) <www.frc.org.uk/directors/corporate-governance-and-stewardship/uk-
corporate-governance-code/history-of-the-uk-corporate-governance-code> accessed 
20 July 2019. 
10 The Cadbury Report (n 5) 14. 
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the financial interests of their owners (if any), instead seeking to benefit the public at 
large or a significantly large section of the public.11 
At approximately the same time that the Cadbury Report’s recommendations were 
being formulated, the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) considered 
governance for the voluntary sector. It also published its recommendations in 1992.12 
The first voluntary sector specific governance code of practice was published by sector 
umbrella organisations in June 200513 (2005 Code). Although the 2005 Code does not 
give its own definition of governance, it refers to a definition published elsewhere,14 
being: ‘the systems and processes concerned with the overall direction, effectiveness, 
supervision and accountability of an organisation’.15 
A second edition (2010 Code) was published in October 2010,16 and a third edition (2017 
Code), known as the Charity Governance Code17 in 2017. The 2017 Code includes in its 
online glossary a simplified definition of governance as ‘the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled’18 and it assumes that all charity trustees are committed to 
‘good governance and want to contribute to their charity’s continued improvement’.19 
It is unfortunate that the 2017 Code’s definition of governance refers to ‘companies’, 
 
11 ‘Public benefit: rules for charities’ (The Charity Commission for England and Wales, 
14 February 2014) <www.gov.uk/guidance/public-benefit-rules-for-charities> accessed 
28 September 2019. 
12 The Working Party on Trustee Training of the National Council for Voluntary 
Organisations, On Trust: Increasing the Effectiveness of Charity Trustees and 
Management Committees (NCVO 1992). 
13 ACEVO, Charity Trustee Networks, ICSA, and NCVO on behalf of The National Hub of 
Expertise in Governance, Good Governance: A code for the voluntary and community 
sector (NCVO 2005). 
14 Chris Cornforth, The Governance of Voluntary and Community Organisations: An 
Overview (Co-operatives UK 2003). 
15 2005 Code (n 13) 4. 
16 The Governance Code Steering Group, Good Governance: A Code for the Voluntary 
and Community Sector (2nd edn, NCVO 2010). 
17 Charity Governance Code Steering Group, Charity Governance Code (3rd edn, NCVO 
2017). 
18 ibid <www.charitygovernancecode.org/en/glossary> accessed 21 July 2019. 
19 2017 Code (n 17) 7. 
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since charities are not restricted to corporate structures, and good governance should 
apply to all charities. 
1.2 Objective 
The author has practised charity law during a period that has spanned the development 
and publication of the 2005 Code, the 2010 Code and the 2017 Code (together the 
Governance Codes). The objective in conducting this research was to consider whether 
the development of the Governance Codes for the charity sector in England and Wales 
has had any material effect on charity law, and whether those codes of practice help 
charity trustees to comply with their legal duties. The assumption is that the 
development of voluntary codes of practice have made little difference, and that they 
had provided little help to charity trustees. 
1.3 Methodology 
To consider the impact of the Governance Codes, the author reviewed their 
development, referring to contemporaneous publications. Searches were completed of 
secondary sources in The Law Society Library in London20 and online legal databases21 
to collate references to the Governance Codes from 2005. All case reports published 
from 2005 by the sector’s main regulator, the Charity Commission for England and 
Wales (the Commission), were also reviewed.  
Searches were made for ‘charit*’ and (‘code’ or ‘governance’ or ‘hallmark’ or 
‘commission*’ or ‘proceeding*’. When searching for references to ‘charity proceedings’, 
further searches were made for references to the relevant statutory provisions.22 
Results relating to matters other than governance, such as tax legislation, were not 
considered further. 
 
20 Books, encyclopaedias, loose-leaf services and journals. 
21 Westlaw, Lexis library, Bailii, Lawtel, Practical Law, and the UK Legislation database. 
22 Charity Act 1993, s 33 and Charities Act 2011, s 115. 
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1.4 Structure 
This thesis sets out the development of the Governance Codes since 2005, and how the 
Governance Codes relate to the legal duties of charity trustees (Chapter 2). The 
relationship between the Governance Codes and primary legislation that has been 
enacted since 2005 is considered to see if the language or principles set out in the 
Governance Codes have been reflected in statute (Chapter 3). 
Having established the relationship between the Governance Codes and statutes, the 
relevance of the Governance Codes to the regulators of the registered charity sector, 
especially the Commission23 (Chapter 4) is considered, and how the Governance Codes 
have been referenced in relevant case law (Chapter 5) is analysed. The reports of the 
Select Committees and the Law Commission are considered to see if any proposed 
statutory reform makes reference to the Governance Codes (Chapter 6). Last, the 
assumption that the Governance Codes have had little effect to date is considered, 
(Chapter 7) and a role for the Governance Codes in the future (Chapter 8) is suggested.  
Abbreviations are listed in Appendix A on page 106. The bibliography includes court 
cases in Appendix C and reports from sector regulators in Appendix D to Appendix G. 
1.5 Limitations 
Although reference to other codes and other sectors will be made, this thesis will only 
consider the charity sector, as regulated by the Commission. When the author 
commenced this research, a limitation of the subject matter to cultural organisations 
was considered, but given the nature of the published Governance Codes, and the lack 
of specific information about cultural charity governance, this thesis considers the effect 
of the Governance Codes for all charities (regardless of their objects) that are subject to 
the Charities Act 2011. 
Charities form part of the larger third sector which also consists of community focussed, 
volunteer led and other co-operative institutions and membership groups that do not 
distribute their profits to their members. They include community interest companies, 
 
23 Charities Act 2011, s 13(1). 
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community benefit societies, social clubs, trade bodies and co-operatives. Although 
earlier versions of the Governance Code were expressed to be relevant to the wider 
sector, the 2017 Code is specifically drafted for the charity sector. The principles set out 
in this thesis may apply to the third sector in general, but it does not consider the effect 
of the Governance Codes on those third sector institutions that are not charities. 
This thesis does not directly consider charities that are exempt from the requirement to 
register with the Commission and are unable to do so voluntarily,24 although the 
Governance Codes may well remain relevant, those organisations have (or will have) a 
different principal regulator and specific regulations that apply to their field of activity 
(for example, education law). Specific sectoral regulation is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
A further limitation relates to the geographic limits of the Charities Act 2011, which 
defines a charity as being an institution subject to the supervision of the High Court.25 
Codes for organisations that are supervised and regulated elsewhere are not 
considered.  
Financial reporting, especially the Statements of Recommended Practices (commonly 
known as SORPs) relating to the charity sector developed by the accounting profession 
as a mechanism to ensure transparency and consistency are not considered. Financial 
governance can be a powerful tool for good governance, but the Governance Codes do 
not separate out financial governance from any other sort of governance, and so a 
detailed consideration of the charity SORPs is also beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Information published after 30 September 2019 has not been considered. 
 
24 Charities Act 2011, s 30(2)(a). 
25 Charities Act 2011, s 1(1). 
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CHAPTER 2 GOVERNANCE CODES AND THE DUTIES OF TRUSTEES 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the legal duties of charity trustees, the development of the 
Governance Codes, and how they relate to each other. Consideration will be given as to 
whether the Governance Codes provide a useful framework for the understanding or 
measurement of those legal duties. 
2.2 Charity trustees 
Under the Charities Act 2011, charity trustees are ‘the persons having the general 
control and management of the administration of a charity’.26 It follows that the 
trustees, acting together, have ultimate legal responsibility for the governance of their 
charity. 
The Commission recognises four legal structures for registered charities: the trust; the 
unincorporated association; the charitable company limited by guarantee, and the 
charitable incorporated organisation27 (or CIO). The trust is the only legal structure that 
does not have a voting membership, and therefore it is the only legal structure for 
registered charities where the trustees have ultimate responsibility and also ultimate 
control of their charity. The other three structures are all designed to be membership 
organisations, with, by default, a voting membership who appoint their board of 
trustees. Under the model constitutions published by the Commission, ultimate control 
is retained by the voting members, who may vote to appoint and remove trustees and 
vote to approve any proposed changes to their charity’s governing document.28 The 
Commission acknowledges that, in some circumstances, it is appropriate for all of the 
voting members to be trustees, and all of the trustees to be voting members (thus 
 
26 Charities Act 2011, s 177. 
27 ‘Charity types: how to choose a structure’ (The Commission, 2014) 
<www.gov.uk/guidance/charity-types-how-to-choose-a-structure> accessed 28 July 
2019. 
28 ‘Setting up a charity: model governing documents’ (The Commission, 2012) 
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/setting-up-a-charity-model-governing-
documents> accessed 28 July 2019. 
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aligning ultimate responsibility with control). This can be evidenced in, for example, the 
Commission’s model constitution of a CIO whose only voting members are its trustees.29 
Regardless of whether the trustees have ultimate control, they will have significant legal 
duties to fulfil, and face censure and personal liability if they fail to fulfil those duties. 
Trustees cannot avoid those obligations by using a different title, and many are used in 
the charity sector.30 31 The overriding duty of trustees is to carry out their role in 
accordance with their charity’s constitution, and not to deviate from its terms.32 They 
must act in the best interests of their charity,33 and promote its purposes.34 
Unlike the role of company director,35 those duties are yet to be codified by statute. 
Some charities are companies, and the company directors are also the charity’s trustees. 
In such circumstances, the trustee is obliged to comply with the duties of company 
directors as well as the general duties of trustees. 
Trustees must comply with the Trustee Act 2000, which specifies a general duty of care 
for the administration of property which is held on trust as the exercise of: 
such care and skill as is reasonable in the circumstances, having regard in 
particular— 
(a) to any special knowledge or experience that he has or holds himself out as 
having, and 
(b) if he acts as trustee in the course of a business or profession, to any special 
knowledge or experience that it is reasonable to expect of a person acting in the 
course of that kind of business or profession.36 
 
29 The Commission, Constitution of a Charitable Incorporated Organisation whose only 
voting members are its charity trustees’ (2016) 3.  
30 Chris Priestley, The ICSA Charity Trustee’s Guide (3rd edn, ICSA Publishing 2012) 9. 
31 Keith Arrowsmith, The Methuen Amateur Theatre Handbook (Methuen 2001) 210. 
32 Re Greater Manchester Educational Trust [1980] Ch Com Rep 28 – 30. 
33 A-G v Kerr (1840) 2 Beav 420 (Lord Langdale MR). 
34 Harries v Church Commissioners for England and Wales [1993] 2 All ER 300. 
35 Companies Act 2006, ss 170 to 177. 
36 Trustee Act 2000, s 1(1). 
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Trustees of CIOs are subject to duties set out in the Charities Act 2011 s 221: 
(1) Each charity trustee of a CIO must exercise the powers and perform the 
functions that the charity trustee has in that capacity in the way that the charity 
trustee decides, in good faith, would be most likely to further the purposes of the 
CIO. 
(2) Each charity trustee of a CIO must in the performance of functions in that 
capacity exercise such care and skill as is reasonable in the circumstances, having 
regard in particular— 
(a) to any special knowledge or experience that the charity trustee has or purports 
to have, and 
(b) if the charity trustee acts as such in the course of a business or profession, to 
any special knowledge or experience that it is reasonable to expect of a person 
acting in the course of that kind of business or profession. 
These general statements of the trustee’s duties are supplemented and qualified by 
other statutes.37 Different commentators express those duties in different ways. For 
example, The Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA) set out 15 
duties in their guide,38 whereas NCVO summarise the duties as: 
• Duty to comply with the governing document; 
• Duty of care; 
• Duty to comply with the law; 
• Duty to protect the charity’s property; 
• Duty to act in the interests of beneficiaries and avoid conflicts of interest; 
• Duty to act collectively; and 
• Duty not to financially benefit unless authorised.39 
 
37 Halsbury’s Laws (5th edn, 2015) Vol 8. 
38 ICSA, The role and duties of charity trustees (England and Wales) (2018) 6 – 7. 
39 Peter Dyer (ed), The Good Trustee Guide (NCVO 2010) 31 – 38. 
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2.3 Purpose of codes of practice 
Codes of practice can provide a framework for behaviour for a particular sector, group 
or profession. A particular code may be published to regulate the membership of a 
group or profession, for example, the Code of Conduct for Solicitors forms part of the 
Solicitor’s Regulation Handbook.40 
Some Codes of Practice that are relevant to parts of the charity sector are published 
under statutory authority. For example, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 requires the Lord 
Chancellor to publish a Code of Practice to guide those with duties and functions under 
the Act.41 Once published, that Code has statutory force, meaning that it creates legal 
duties for specified people who work with or care for adults who may lack capacity to 
make decisions for themselves, whether in the charity sector or not. 
Other statutory codes do not have statutory force but are persuasive if a dispute is 
considered by the courts. For example, the Equality Act 2006 (as amended by the 
Equality Act 2010), which applies to all charities, allows for the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission to issue Codes of Practice to ‘ensure or facilitate compliance with 
the Equality Act 2010 … or to promote equality of opportunity’.42 The Equality and 
Human Rights Commission’s Employment Statutory Code of Practice makes it clear that 
it: 
… does not impose legal obligations. Nor is it an authoritative statement of the 
law; only the tribunals and the courts can provide such authority. However, the 
Code can be used in evidence in legal proceedings brought under the Act. 
Tribunals and courts must take into account any part of the Code that appears to 
them relevant to any questions arising in proceedings.43 
Many codes of practice are non-statutory and are designed to promote best practice 
with a particular sector or field of practice. Codes of practice may help make the relevant 
 
40 Solicitors Regulation Authority, SRA Handbook (ver 21 2018). 
41 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 42. 
42 Equality Act 2006, s 14(2). 
43 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Employment Statutory Code of Practice 
(2011) 23. 
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regulations more accessible, more relevant, and may well be more flexible and easier to 
update than statutory codified duties. 
Specific parts of the charity sector have developed their own codes of practice, but the 
Governance Codes are the only current published comprehensive governance codes of 
practice for the whole sector. 
2.4 The Governance Codes 
The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance was set up by the 
Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession 
in May 1991.44 The Committee’s purpose was to review the financial reporting and 
accountability aspects of corporate governance,45 and therefore its suggested Code of 
Best Practice46 had a focus that was not easily adopted by not for profit organisations. 
It formulated a series of checks and balances between the board and its executive 
management, and between the company and its auditors. It originally consisted of 19 
provisions, compared to the 41 provisions of the latest version.47 
The voluntary sector’s response was slower, perhaps ‘overdue’.48 The 2005 Code was 
created to clarify the main principles of governance and to help organisations ‘in 
decision-making, accountability and the work of their boards’.49 Although primarily 
written for the benefit of trustees of voluntary and community organisations, the 2005 
Code was expressed to also be aimed at (amongst others) chief executives, funders, 
donors, professional advisors and regulators.50 It was endorsed by the NCVO, the 
ACEVO, the Charity Trustee Networks, the ICSA, the National Hub of Expertise in 
Governance and the Commission.51 It states that it is compliant with the legal and 
 
44 The Cadbury Report (n 5) 14. 
45 ibid 11. 
46 ibid 58 – 60. 
47 Financial Reporting Council, UK Corporate Governance Code (2018). 
48 2005 Code (n 13) 4. 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid 5. 
51 ibid 6. 
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regulatory requirements,52 without explaining which are relevant. The authors do not 
go so far as to confirm that compliance with the 2005 Code will fulfil all of a charity 
trustee’s duties. The 2005 Code specifically states that it is not a legal or regulatory 
mandatory requirement, and that compliance is voluntary, although it suggests that 
organisations should explain areas of non-compliance.53 Organisations are invited to 
state their compliance with the Code in their annual reports.54 
The 2005 Code has one overreaching objective of equality, expressed as a way of 
‘ensuring equity, diversity and equality of treatment for all sections of the community,’55 
seven key themes, known as ‘principles’, and 92 provisions. The first key principle, board 
leadership, recognises that charity trustees: 
have and must accept ultimate responsibility for directing the affairs of their 
organisation, ensuring it is solvent, well-run, and delivering the outcomes for 
which it has been set up.56 
All other supporting provisions of this key principle are expressed as non-mandatory 
requirements. The supporting provisions for the 2005 Code’s other key principles specify 
five additional mandatory provisions.57 
The Governance Hub completed a review process of the 2005 Code, and a revised 
second edition was published in 2010. The new edition was designed, in part, to answer 
the criticism that the first edition was not accessible to smaller organisations and less 
experienced boards.58 It also recognised that the sector had changed due to the 
economic downturn, and governance needed to adapt to suit.59 The 2010 Code was 
published in two versions (one designed for smaller organisations with no paid staff), 




54 ibid 8. 
55 ibid 7. 
56 ibid 10. 
57 ibid 12, 23, 26. 
58 2010 Code (n 16) 2. 
59 ibid 3. 
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The way the 2010 Code expresses the relevant legal obligations also changed. Now the 
authors outline: 
… the main areas of law which we consider are relevant to each principle. All board 
members will need to have access to more detailed guidance on their legal duties. 
Charity trustees will also need to refer to Charity Commission guidance on charity 
law and regulation.60 
And 
The principles set out good practice but these are closely linked with the 
responsibilities of charity trustees and other legal requirements that may be 
imposed on board members. Under each principle we have highlighted the areas 
of law which we consider to be most relevant.61 
Any trustees reading the 2010 Code for a full and comprehensive summary of their 
relevant duties and obligations would therefore be disappointed. Although the 2010 
Code offers relative brevity (now one overreaching principle of equality, six key 
principles and 32 provisions), it expresses its principles as only an indication of the 
relevant legal duties, rather than any attempt to provide a succinct codification of them. 
Obligations in the 2010 Code are set out in its supporting material. Despite the Code’s 
nervousness of presenting itself as comprehensive, the six mandatory provisions in the 
2005 Code have been expanded to 29 supporting obligations, ten of which are expressed 
to be obligatory for charity trustees.62 
The third and current edition of the Governance Code was published in 2017 although 
unhelpfully the published version of the 2017 Code is not dated63 and the PDF version 
of the 2017 Code does not include the glossary available online.64 It is published in two 
versions (one for smaller charities who are not subject to audit). This version of the 
Governance Code is addressed only to charities registered by the Commission. This is a 
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marked difference to the two previous versions and no explanation is given for the 
narrowing of its scope. 
The authors suggest ‘Good governance enables and supports a charity’s compliance 
with relevant legislation and regulation’ and ‘The Code is not a legal or regulatory 
requirement … [but] is deliberately aspirational’.65 
The 2017 Code is therefore not a statement of the legal obligations for charity trustees, 
but rather a tool to help the sector restore the public’s faith in registered charities by 
demonstrating ‘exemplary leadership and governance’.66 Rather than be a statement of 
what the law expects of those tasked with governing registered charities, the 2017 Code 
assumes compliance: 
Compliance with the law is an integral part of good governance. This Code does 
not attempt to set out all the legal requirements that apply to charities and charity 
trustees, but it is based on a foundation of trustees’ basic legal and regulatory 
responsibilities. The seven Code principles build on the assumption that charities 
are already meeting this foundation.67 
The 2017 Code has one overreaching principle of organisational purpose, six further 
principles, 22 key outcomes, 76 recommended practices and an online glossary. No 
distinction is made between which practices are mandatory and which are not. The 2017 
Code is therefore the longest of the editions by far. This is a potential barrier, especially 
for trustees and charities with limited resources. 
Although the Governance Codes can be seen to have credibility having been prepared 
by sector representatives, the committee approach to drafting may also be a barrier, 
since no one organisation takes ownership of the end result, or acts as a point of contact 
for governance compliance issues. As will be shown below, this scattergun approach was 
a criticism levelled at the charitable fundraising governance bodies. 
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Compliance with the Governance Code is complex to measure or audit, since many of 
its provisions are expressed to be aspirational. With no easily recognised compliance 
badge or logo, or central database of those who have adopted the Governance Code, it 
may continue to be hard to identify the take up of the Governance Code by charities 
over time. 
2.5 Other codes of practice for charitable activities 
The Commission published its own code in 2004 entitled The Hallmarks of an Effective 
Charity. it is similar to the Governance Codes in that the Hallmarks are designed to 
encourage good practice as a tool to fulfil legal obligations: 
Compliance with the law is an integral part of good governance and effective 
performance. This guidance does not attempt to set out all the legal requirements 
that apply to charities and charity trustees.68 
The code is divided into six principles, and 44 statements of recommended practice. Of 
those 44 statements, eight are expressed to be legal requirements. 
The Commission was criticised for producing the Hallmarks in 200669 on the basis that 
there was confusion between the different available codes of practice, and there was a 
lack of clarity as to which provisions were obligatory and which were voluntary. The 
Hallmarks were revised in July 2008 but withdrawn in 2017. 
At the same time the 2005 Code was being prepared, the Institute of Fundraising set up 
a separate scheme to promote best practice and good governance in relation to 
fundraising from the public.70 A Code of Fundraising Practice (the Fundraising Code) was 
published, and the latest version, effective from 1st October 2019 was published by the 
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Fundraising Regulator71 (established in 2016 to take over fundraising regulation). The 
Fundraising Code is considered further below.72 
The ICSA published a guidance note73 which refers to the Nolan Principles, and suggests 
standards for governance and leadership for charity trustees. The Nolan Principles were 
first set out by Lord Nolan in 1995 as standards expected of public office holders, and 
they now form part of the Ministerial Code.74 The ICSA’s note acknowledges the need 
for trustees to understand and comply with legal and regulatory requirements and ‘also 
to adopting good governance in a form that is effective and proportionate’.75 However 
the guide does not distinguish between governance and leadership. The note expresses 
its guidance as three ‘standards’ of values, competence and probity rather than a code 
of practice, and justifies that stance because of the need for trustees and charity 
managers to ‘conduct themselves in accordance with the highest standards’ both inside 
and outside of a charity environment.76 
Elsewhere, the Northern Ireland’s Developing Governance Group published its code in 
2008, which was revised in 2016.77 The Scottish Charity Regulator published guidance 
for Scottish charity trustees in 2016,78 and Scotland’s Third Sector Governance Forum 
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published a code of practice for the third sector in November 2018.79 This last code is 
notable for its brevity, with five principles each expressed in less than a page of text. 
2.6 Other codes of practice for parts of the charitable sector 
Some parts of the charitable sector have developed their own codes of practice. For 
example, the National Housing Federation’s Code of Governance,80 which makes it 
mandatory for any organisation that adopts its Code to publish an annual statement of 
compliance with a reasoned statement about any areas of non-compliance.  
Any organisation seeking public funding for sport and physical activity must 
demonstrate an appropriate high standard of good governance, making compliance 
with UK Sport’s Code81 mandatory for funded organisations. 
Arts Council England does not produce its own governance code. The Clore Leadership 
Programme founded the Cultural Governance Alliance82 and published A Practical Guide 
to Governance in the Arts and Museums,83 but compliance is not mandatory for 
membership of the Alliance or funding from ACE. 
2.7 Quality Standards 
A recognised quality standard can offer charities an externally verified approval process, 
and compliance with a standard can easily demonstrate a charity’s commitment to 
quality assurance to stakeholders and funders. 
In 2006, National Occupational Standards (or NOS) for Trustees and Management 
Committee Members in the Voluntary and Community Sector were approved by the UK 
 
79 Scotland’s Third Sector Governance Forum, The Scottish Governance Code for the 
Third Sector (2018). 
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Education Regulatory Authorities.84 The Standards were created to complement the 
2005 Code,85 and demonstrated a standard of competence and outcomes relevant to a 
trustee’s role. The NOS set out four units which refer the reader to the legal 
requirements and best practice for good governance. The Standards were adopted by 
the sector skills council, Skills Third Sector (now defunct), and remain a recognised NOS, 
despite not being updated. None of the four units make it clear which responsibilities 
are legal obligations. 
The NCVO currently offer two quality standards, Trusted Charity Essentials and the 
Trusted Charity quality mark, which was previously known as PQASSO.86 The former is 
an online free tool for smaller organisations to benchmark their activities in 10 key areas. 
The latter is a paid-for online self-assessment tool, followed by an external validation by 
an independent assessor. It is currently in its fourth edition. It has 11 ‘quality areas’, the 
first of which is governance. Accreditation lasts three years, but there is no publicly 
accessible online database of who has achieved the Trusted Charity quality mark. A copy 
of the standard is only available upon payment of a fee. This creates a potential conflict 
of interest since NCVO is both a contributor to the Governance Code and a provider of 
quality standard services. 
2.8 Conclusion 
The legal duties of charity trustees are not comprehensively defined in statute. Unlike 
directors of public limited companies, there is no obligatory or statutory code of practice 
for charity trustees. The 2017 Code covers governance aspects of trustee duties, but 
compliance with it is not obligatory since its provisions go further than the generally 
accepted legal obligations of the trustees. 
The authors of the 2017 Code set up trustees to fail: the 2017 Code’s terms are designed 
to be aspirational and may never be achieved in full by smaller charities with limited 
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means. Further, the 2017 Code only addresses charity trustees, and not others 
(including CIO members) who may be under the same or similar duties.87 Measuring 
compliance with the 2017 Code is difficult, and no one body is tasked with the 
promotion of the Governance Code or governance for charities in general. 
The number of different codes of practice across the different jurisdictions may cause 
difficulties for those organisations that operate in more than one nation. In any event, 
most of the published codes referred to above have been updated from time to time, 
but none of the publishers provide easily accessible online copies of the previous 
versions of the codes, or an easy way to compare versions. This could mean that, should 
an issue arise in the future, it will be difficult for a trustee to review what was best 
practice at the relevant time. 
Other alternatives, such as quality marks are either out of date or are only available 
upon payment of a fee. 
Having established the nature and scope of the Governance Codes, their impact on 
legislation will now be considered. 
 
87 Discussed further in para 3.2 below. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE GOVERNANCE CODE AND LEGISLATION 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the publication of the 2005 Code, three charity sector specific statutes have been 
passed, and many other public general and local acts have been brought into force that 
refer to the charity sector. 
In considering whether the Governance Codes have had any material effect on 
legislation, the provisions of all Acts that have received Royal Assent since 01 January 
2005 that have not been repealed and that apply to bodies regulated by the Commission 
have been reviewed. 
Of the 129 potentially relevant general statutes,88 three are directly relevant to trustee 
duties and the Governance Code, another one deals with conflicts of interests for 
charitable company directors, and the rest, although relevant to charity law, were not 
relevant to the governance of registered charities. 
3.2 The Charities Act 2006 
The genesis of the Charities Act 2006 (2006 Act) can be traced back to July 2001 when 
the government announced a review of the not for profit sector by the Cabinet Office’s 
Strategy Unit and the Home Office.89 At the time it was thought that ‘much of the legal 
context for charity and voluntary action is now outdated’.90 The Review recognised that 
regulation of charities may contribute to making sure that governance is conducted 
properly to protect the public, donors and promote public confidence.91 The Review 
concluded that the ‘company corporate governance regime is not tailored to fit the 
trustee governance structure,’92 and discussed the benefits of creating new charitable 
(and social enterprise) structures. 
 
88 <www.legislation.gov.uk> search for general Acts enacted between 2005 and 2019 
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A second governance theme explored in the Review related to the need for charities to 
recruit and retain high quality trustees from diverse backgrounds, suggesting that 
charities should disclose in their annual reports how trustees are selected and equipped 
for their role. This suggestion is taken up in the 2017 Code in Principle 5, where the 
importance of a rigorous approach to trustee recruitment, performance and 
development are recognised,93 and in Principle 6, where it is recommended that the 
charity should publish what it has done to address board diversity.94 
Trustee behaviour, and trustee duties are also addressed in the Review: 
Good governance is crucial to ensuring that organisations are operating 
effectively. Governance problems can have a profound impact, especially when 
organisations are forced to dedicate considerable resources to resolving internal 
disputes. For most organisations, however, governance problems mean that they 
are less enterprising and less focused on quality improvement than they might be 
because board members lack the necessary skills, knowledge and expertise. Board 
recruitment, retention and training are therefore crucially important.95 
No specific recommendations were made in the Review to address the identified lack of 
skills, knowledge and expertise of trustees. A consultation process followed, with the 
Home Office publishing its findings in 2003.96 Although specific recommendations were 
made in relation to the legal structure for charities,97 recruitment of trustees and 
payments to trustees,98 very little else was included in relation to the trustees’ 
governance of charities. The government introduced a draft Bill in May 2004, which was 
passed in 2006. 
The 2006 Act amends the Charities Act 1992 and the Charities Act 1993 (the 1993 Act). 
The only specific reference to ‘governance’ in the 2006 Act is in relation to the internal 
operations of the Commission by inserting into the 1993 Act a new section, 1D, by which 
the Commission must have regard ‘to such generally accepted principles of good 
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corporate governance as it is reasonable to regard as applicable to it’.99 This means that 
although the Commission is obliged by statute to have regard to good governance, the 
charities it regulates do not. 
That said, some of the provisions of the 2006 Act updated aspects of charity law that 
may have an indirect impact on governance, and the duties of trustees. For the first 
time, this statute includes a general statutory definition of charity,100 charitable 
purposes,101 and public benefit.102 By setting out a modern framework for trustees to 
operate under, governance may well have become easier to understand. The 2006 Act 
also abolishes the presumption that charitable purposes for the relief of poverty, the 
advancement of education and the advancement of religion are for the public benefit.103 
All charity trustees must now be able to justify the public benefit of their charity’s 
activities. 
The 2006 Act also includes a statutory duty for trustees,104 which inserts a new section 
3B into the 1993 Act, requiring charity trustees to apply to the Commission for their 
charity to be registered, and to keep their registration up to date, but this did no more 
than repeat the existing law. Similarly, the duty of trustees to exercise reasonable care 
and skill when deciding to pay a trustee for services rendered, or to pay for trustee 
indemnity insurance, is repeated105 in terms that are the same as those set out in the 
Trustee Act 2000.106 
The 2006 Act introduces a new charitable structure,107 known as a charitable 
incorporated organisation (or CIO): 
The CIO is the first legal form to be created specifically to meet the needs of 
charities. Its purpose is to avoid the need for charities which wish to benefit from 
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incorporation to register as companies and be liable to dual regulation by 
Companies House as well as the Charity Commission.108 
A CIO is similar to a body corporate with a constitution, rather than articles of 
association. Like a company, it has a voting membership with limited liability. Schedule 
7 of the 2006 Act inserts a new Schedule 5B into the 1993 Act, which includes two 
specific provisions relating to the CIO’s trustees’ duties. Paragraph 8 of Schedule 5B 
makes it clear that the trustees must ‘act within the CIO’s constitution and in accordance 
with any constitution limitations on their powers’. This does no more than repeat the 
position for directors of charitable companies. Paragraph 9 includes an obligation to act 
in good faith: 
It is the duty of – 
(a) Each member of a CIO, and 
(b) Each charity trustee of a CIO, 
to exercise his powers, and (in the case of a charity trustee) to perform his 
functions, in his capacity as such, in the way he decides, in good faith, would be 
most likely to further the purposes of the CIO.109 
Paragraph 10 repeats the duty to use reasonable care as set out in the Trustee Act 2000 
section 1. So, as far as the charity trustee is concerned, the duties owed by CIO trustees 
are the same as trustees of other charitable structures. However, Paragraph 9 states 
that the duty to act in good faith also applies to the charity’s membership. 
Whether or not a member of a charitable company or a charitable unincorporated 
association owes a duty to their charity is uncertain. The Commission issued guidance 
which stated: 
The Charity Commission considers that the rights that exist in relation to the 
administration of a charitable institution are fiduciary, regardless of the identity 
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of the person or persons on whom the rights are conferred. Therefore this applies 
to both individual and corporate members.110 
But: 
Some uncertainty does exist, however, about the extent to which members of 
charitable companies are legally obliged to vote in the best interests of the charity 
of which they are a member. It has been argued that the members of charitable 
companies are in the same position legally as the members of non-charitable 
companies.111 
It therefore appears that, at least for CIO structures, any doubt is resolved by making 
the member’s duty to act in good faith clear through statutory provision. It would seem 
that the duty of the charity trustee and the duty of the CIO’s members are the same, 
and in the absence of any further statutory guidance as to the meaning of the fiduciary 
duty, the same obligations could apply to both trustee and member. However, the 2006 
Act did not clarify whether members of charitable companies or charitable 
unincorporated organisations are also under the same fiduciary duty, or any duty at all. 
The matter is being considered by the courts and is discussed further in paragraph 5.6 
below.112 
The Governance Codes make no distinction between the charitable structures, and do 
not address any governance obligations of a charity’s members. In Principle 7 of the 
2017 Code, it is suggested that the trustees should inform the members of the charity’s 
work, and have clear policies on who is eligible for membership of the charity, but no 
suggestion is made that the trustees should inform the members of their rights and 
fiduciary obligations at all.113 
The 2006 Act makes no other reference to the duties of trustees (or members). Perhaps 
is it not surprising that the Act does not refer to governance in general terms, or the 
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Governance Codes in particular, given much of the development work for the 2005 Code 
took place after the preliminary drafting of the statute had been completed. 
Conversely, the Governance Codes have been reviewed and updated since 2006, but yet 
no mention is made of the clear duty of CIO members to act in good faith, or how that 
duty relates to the work of the trustees. At least in this aspect, the Governance Codes 
may be seen to be unhelpful, leaving any member wishing to understand their role in 
governance unsatisfied. 
3.3 The Charities Act 2011 
The Charities Act 2011 (the 2011 Act) was prepared by the Law Commission, working 
with the Office for Civil Society and supported by the Commission. It consolidates much 
of the existing charities legislation but does not change the existing law or introduce any 
new policy.114 It received Royal Assent on 14 December 2011 and came into force on 14 
March 2012. The 2011 Act is not a comprehensive statement of charity law. Some 
provisions of the Charities Acts of 1992 and 2006 relating to public charitable collections 
and fundraisers were not consolidated. 
The only specific reference to ‘governance’ in the 2011 Act is in relation to the internal 
operations of the Commission. What was previously section 1D of the Charities Act 1993 
now appears in section 16 (6). 
Trustee duties are referred to, but, as may be expected of a consolidating statute, do no 
more than repeat the existing law in a more clearly structured way. The statutory 
fiduciary duty for CIO members is repeated.115 No reference is made to the Governance 
Codes. 
3.4 Charities (Protection and Social Investment) 2016 
This statute (the 2016 Act) covers three areas of charity law: 
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1) the protection of charities, by equipping the Commission to address cases of 
abuse more effectively;116 
2) the ability of charities to make social investments;117 and 
3) the prevention of intrusive fundraising practices by placing more stringent 
obligations on charities who wish to use professional fundraisers, including 
reporting obligations for larger charities,118 and by extending the 
Commission’s reserve powers for the future.119 
The 2016 Act does not make any specific reference to ‘governance’ at all, despite the 
2016 Act’s aim, at least in part, to improve the governance of charities. The 2016 Act 
grants the Commission the power to issue and publish official warnings to charities (or 
individual trustees) if it considers a breach of trust or duty, or other misconduct or 
mismanagement has occurred.120 Government intended official warnings to be: 
… a more reasonable and proportionate way of dealing with breaches of statutory 
provisions of the Charities Act 2011, breaches of fiduciary duty or other 
mismanagement where the risks and impact on charitable assets and services are 
relatively low. Sometimes this may be as a more proportionate alternative to use 
of remedial powers such as suspensions, or removal of trustees or restitution 
action against trustees.121 
The Commission provided examples of situations in which it expected to issue official 
warnings. Those examples included governance problems: 
Breaches of a charity’s governing document that lead to governance problems. For 
example, not running internal elections properly or repeated failure to call Annual 
General Meetings. This can lead to complaints and disputes within a charity but 
often the impact is not great enough to justify the use of current powers. A 
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published Warning could promote compliance and increase transparency and 
wider public trust and confidence.122 
The Commission has no power to issue an official warning to a member of a CIO, despite 
the requirement for such members to act in the best interests of their charity. This 
would seem to create a different regulatory regime for members to trustees, despite 
both roles having the same duties. Official warnings are further considered in paragraph 
4.6 below.123 
The opportunity to refer to the Governance Code (or failures to comply with the 
Governance Code) as a factor when deciding whether or not the Commission should use 
its new powers was not taken up by the legislators. The recommended practice set out 
in Principle 7 of the 2017 Code refers to developing a culture of openness within the 
charity, and especially the complaint handling processes,124 but does not specifically 
refer to warnings, suspensions or disqualification of trustees. 
The 2016 Act places a new obligation on professional fundraisers to enter into 
agreements that include arrangements for charities to monitor compliance, and for the 
annual reports of larger charities to include a fundraising compliance statement. Given 
the public outcry relating to fundraising practices125 in the lead up to the passing of the 
2016 Act, it is surprising that the legislation does not include further duties or obligations 
on trustees. It seems that the intention of parliament was to reinforce the responsibility 
of trustees to ‘ensure that fund-raising for their charity is undertaken responsibility and 
in a manner that does not damage public trust and confidence in their charity or the 
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wider charity sector’126 but the only mechanism in the 2016 Act to achieve that aim is 
an obligation of greater transparency for audited charities.127 
Charities are given the power to make investments that both directly further a charity’s 
purposes and achieve a financial return for the charity.128 The power may only be 
exercised if the trustees: 
(a) consider whether in all the circumstances any advice about the proposed 
social investment ought to be obtained; 
(b) obtain and consider any advice they conclude ought to be obtained; and 
(c) satisfy themselves that it is in the interests of the charity to make the social 
investment, having regard to the benefit they expect it to achieve for the 
charity (by directly furthering the charity’s purposes and achieving a 
financial return). 
(3) … from time to time review the charity’s social investments.129 
This process of obtaining and considering specialist advice is found elsewhere, including 
the obligations set out in the Trustee Act 2000, and will be familiar to trustees who have 
purchased land or buildings.130 The recommended practice associated with Principle 5 
of the 2017 Code refers to the board collectively accessing ‘independent professional 
advice, such as legal or financial advice, at the charity’s expense if needed for the board 
to discharge its duties’.131 
No other provisions in the 2016 Act relate to trustee duties or their governance 
functions. 
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3.5 The Companies Act 2006 
The only other statute that contains a reference to governance arrangements for 
trustees is the Companies Act 2006. That Act contains, in Chapter 2 of Part 10, the scope 
and nature of the general duties of company directors.132 Those general duties are a 
statutory code of conduct, which, prior to the Act coming into force, were set out in 
equitable and common law rules. The Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission (together, the CLR) published their joint report133 and recommended a 
partial codification of company director’s main fiduciary duties and duties of care and 
skill, which should not be exhaustive.134 In particular they wanted: 
• To provide greater clarity on what is expected of directors and make the 
law more accessible. In particular they sought to address the key question 
“in whose interests should companies be run?” in a way which reflects 
modern business needs and wider expectations of responsible business 
behaviour; 
• To make development of the law in this area more predictable (but without 
hindering development of the law by the courts); 
• To correct what the CLR saw as defects in the present duties relating to 
conflicts of interest.135 
It is surprising that a similar argument did not prevail when considering trustee duties, 
leaving the commercial sector with, arguably, greater clarity and more predictability 
than the charity sector.  
The defects in the duties relating to conflicts of interest were addressed by the 
Companies Act 2006.136 The new regulations allow transactions between the company 
and its directors which do not need to be authorised by the members or independent 
board members, but rather declared. The Act also permits board authorisation of most 
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conflicts of interest arising from third party transactions by a director. Section 181 
modifies those provisions for charitable companies. 
The 2017 Code addresses conflicts of interest in Principe 3, expecting trustees to disclose 
actual or potential conflicts and to deal with them in accordance with the charity’s 
constitution and a regularly reviewed conflicts of interest policy. 
3.6 Other Statutes 
In the period in question, 125 other UK Public General Acts were passed that made 
reference to charities.137 None make reference to the Governance Codes. 
3.7 Local Acts 
Seven local Acts of parliament were passed in the period in question referring to the 
charity sector.138 None make any reference to governance, and none relate to trustee 
duties. 
3.8 Secondary Legislation 
60 United Kingdom Statutory instruments with ‘charity’, ‘charitable’ or ‘charities’ in their 
name were passed in the period in question.139 None make any reference to 
‘governance’, and none relate to trustee duties. 
On that basis, a wider consideration of other statutory instruments was not undertaken. 
3.9 Conclusion 
Despite the development of the Governance Codes over a period during which three 
charity sector specific statutes were passed, no attempt by the legislators was made to 
codify the duties of trustees, by reference to the Governance Codes or otherwise.  
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At the same time, a statutory duty to act in the best interests of a CIO has been 
introduced for members, but no attempt has been made to clarify whether the same 
duty applies to other charitable membership organisations.  
The 2017 Code does not acknowledge any duties of charitable members and does not 
refer to the Commission’s new power to issue official warnings. It therefore seems that 
legislation and the Governance Codes have always been separate, with nothing to 
indicate that the legislators are aware of the existence of the Governance Codes at all.  
The next chapter will consider whether the sector’s regulators are aware, and take 
account of, the Governance Codes. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE GOVERNANCE CODE AND REGULATORS  
4.1 Introduction 
The Commission was constituted by the Charitable Trusts Act 1853140 and incorporated 
by the 2006 Act.141 It is the non-ministerial government department tasked with being 
the statutory registrar and regulator for charities in England and Wales.142 The 
Commission’s general functions include giving advice and guidance to charities; 
identifying and investigating allegations of misconduct or mismanagement in the 
administration of charities, and taking action relating to maladministration of 
charities.143 
Similar bodies exist in Scotland and Northern Ireland, the activities of which are beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Charitable organisations in England and Wales may also be 
registered by the Financial Conduct Authority (if they are Registered Societies) or by the 
Regulator of Social Housing (if they are Housing Associations) or by Companies House (if 
they are charitable companies). Charitable chartered bodies are regulated by the Privy 
Council (insofar as it approves changes to chartered bodies’ charter and bylaws). 
‘Excepted’ charities do not need to register with the Commission or submit annual 
returns. This group of organisations include churches, Scout and Guide Groups, armed 
forces funds and student unions if their income is under £100,000. Despite being 
‘excepted’ from registration, the Commission regulates their activities.144 ‘Exempt’ 
charities do not register with the Commission and are directly regulated by other bodies. 
The Commission may investigate an exempt charity’s activities by statutory inquiry at 
the request of its principal regulator. Exempt charities include some universities and 
 
140 Public Administration Committee, The Role of the Charity Commission and “public 
benefit”: Post-legislative scrutiny of the Charities Act 2006 (HC 2013-14, 76-I). 
141 Charities Act 2006, s 6. 
142 ‘About us’ (The Commission, undated) 
<www.gov.uk/government/organisations/charity-commission/about> accessed 18 
August 2019. 
143 Charities Act 2011, s 15. 
144 ‘Excepted Charities’ (The Commission, 11 June 2014) 
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/excepted-charities/> accessed 30 September 
2019.  
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other educational establishments that are regulated by the Department for Education, 
and some museums and galleries of national importance and the British Library which 
are regulated by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.145 
In addition to the Commission, the Fundraising Regulator, the Information 
Commissioner and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs have a regulatory role across 
the sector. The impact of the Governance Codes will be assessed for each body. 
4.2 The Commission as a source of guidance 
One of the Commission’s functions is to encourage and facilitate the better 
administration of charities.146 It may ‘give advice or guidance with respect to the 
administration of charities as it considers appropriate’.147 The advice or guidance may 
relate to the charity sector, any class of charity or a specific charity, and can be given in 
any form or manner that the Commission considers appropriate.148 The Commission’s 
publications have been moved from its own website to the gov.uk website, and all of its 
guidance is now published in PDF and HTML format online.  
In June 2003, the Commission published a framework that set out how it regulates 
charities.149 It was followed by The Hallmarks of an effective charity (CC60)150 which was 
the Commission’s suggested code of practice for the sector. The publication was subject 
to some criticism, with umbrella organisations complaining that it was confusing for a 
regulator to publish aspirational guidance.151 The Commission revised its Hallmarks, and 
the second edition was published as CC10.152 It: 
 
145 The Commission, Exempt charities (CC23 2013, updated 9 August 2019) 
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/exempt-charities-cc23/exempt-charities> 
accessed 30 September 2019. 
146 Charities Act 2011, s 15(1)2. 
147 Charities Act 2011, s 15(2). 
148 Charities Act 2011, s 15(3). 
149 The Commission, The Charity Commission and Regulation (June 2003). 
150 The Commission, The Hallmarks of an Effective Charity (CC60 April 2004). 
151 Nathalie Thomas, ‘Charity Commission told to end confusing efforts at guidance’ 
(2006) 413 Third Sector 2. 
152 The Hallmarks of an effective charity (n 68). 
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… sets out the standards that will help trustees to improve the effectiveness of 
their charity, and the principles that the commission’s regulatory framework exists 
to support… Whilst a few of these are legal requirements, most are matters of 
good practice.153  
Both editions of the Hallmarks therefore share the Governance Code’s aim to assist 
trustees to comply with their duties without promising that the framework is 
comprehensive. At the time that CC10 was published, the Commission’s view was that 
the Governance Code and the Hallmarks were complementary.154 Hallmark 3 of CC60 
states: 
An effective charity is run by a clearly identifiable trustee body that has the right 
balance of skills and experience to run the charity effectively, acts in the best 
interests of the charity and its beneficiaries, understands its responsibilities and 
has systems in place to exercise them effectively. 
This was refined in CC10 to become Hallmark 2: A strong board: 
An effective charity is run by a clearly identifiable board or trustee body that has 
the right balance of skills and experience, acts in the best interests of the charity 
and its beneficiaries, understands its responsibilities and has systems in place to 
exercise them properly. 
In its response to the consultation on the draft version of what became the 2017 Code, 
the Commission acknowledged ‘the importance of effective governance in underpinning 
charities’ effectiveness and legal compliance’. It states that its remit is ‘to enable and 
promote good practice in trusteeship’ but: 
The regulator can endorse and promote, but not own or enforce, standards of 
good practice … We will consider further how we can take account of charities’ 
consideration and application of the [2017] Code in our regulatory interactions 
with them and in the requirements and expectations for reporting.155 
This seems to leave trustees with no comprehensive statement as to their governance 
obligations, nor even a clear statement as to what effect any failure to follow the 2017 
 
153 ibid, 3. 
154 ibid. 
155 The Commission, New code of governance consultation – a response from the 
Charity Commission for England and Wales (01 February 2017). 
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Code, or any other code, would have in the Commission’s regulatory decision-making 
processes. 
CC10 was withdrawn by the Commission on 13 July 2017.156 In the Commission’s 
publication scheme, reference is now made to the 2017 Code as being ‘a practical tool 
to help charities and their trustees develop high standards of governance’.157 
The Commission’s CC60 referred to its other publications, which included 
Responsibilities of Charity Trustees (CC3).158 That guidance has since been revised and 
reissued as The Essential Trustee.159 The first version of the guidance sets out ‘briefly 
and simply the duties of charity trustees’160 mainly by reference to circumstances 
trustees may encounter. Later versions (despite running to 40 pages) only explain ‘the 
key duties … and what trustees need to do to carry out those duties competently’.161 It 
summarises the trustee’s main legal responsibilities as making sure: 
• a trustee is eligible to be a charity trustee; 
• a trustee acts with reasonable care and skill in the charity’s best interests; 
• a trustee complies with the charity’s constitution and the law; 
• the charity’s resources are managed responsibly; and 
• the charity is accountable and carrying out its purposes for the public benefit.162 
 
156 The Hallmarks of an effective charity (n 68). 
157 ‘Publication scheme’ (The Commission, undated) 
<www.gov.uk/government/organisations/charity-commission/about/publication-
scheme> accessed 18 August 2019. 
158 The Commission, Responsibilities of Charity Trustees (CC3 September 1999, revised 
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March 2018, and 3 May 2018). 
160 Responsibilities of Charity Trustees (n 158) 1. 
161 The Essential Trustee (n 159) 2. 
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In setting out trustees’ potential liability to charities, the Commission reassures by 
stating the law ‘generally protects trustees who have acted honestly and reasonably 
from personal liability to their charity’.163 
In explaining why the guidance is relevant, the Commission states: 
When the Commission looks into cases of potential breach of trust or duty or other 
misconduct or mismanagement, it may take account of evidence that trustees 
have exposed the charity, its assets or its beneficiaries to harm or undue risk by 
not following good practice.164 
Given the Commission has welcomed the Governance Code as a tool for good practice, 
it is therefore disappointing that the Commission has not clarified how the guidance in 
CC3 relates to the Governance Code, and how compliance with the Governance Code 
will be taken into account when considering compliance matters. The Governance Code 
is only given as an example of a tool for compliance reviews.165 
The Commission takes a different attitude when considering the relationship between 
its guidance and the Fundraising Code. The Commission defines taking responsibility for 
a charity’s fundraising as including: 
Identifying and following any recognised standards that apply to your charity’s 
fundraising. These are in the Fundraising Regulator’s Code of Fundraising Practice. 
The Code outlines both the legal rules that apply to fundraising and the standards 
designed to ensure that fundraising is open, honest and respectful. The 
Commission expects all charities that fundraise to fully comply with the 
[Fundraising] Code.166 
It therefore seems that the Commission expects trustees to comply with the Fundraising 
Code, but not the Governance Code. 
 
163 ibid para 10.1. 
164 ibid 3. 
165 Ibid 30. 
166 The Commission, Charity Fundraising: a guide to trustee duties (CC20 November 
2016) 6. 
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Under the Charities Act 2011, trustees must have regard to the Commission’s guidance 
on the public benefit requirement for all activities of all charities.167 This legal obligation 
is reflected in rationale for Principle 7 of the 2017 Code: 
The public’s trust that a charity is delivering public benefit is fundamental to its 
reputation and success, and by extension, the success of the wider sector.168 
It therefore seems that there has been some attempt to align the Governance Code to 
the expectations of the Commission, even if the Commission’s attitude to the 
Governance Code is ambivalent. 
Even though the Hallmarks has been withdrawn, the Commission has continued to 
provide sector wide guidance in the form of its regulatory alerts.169 Alerts published 
since January 2010 appear on the Commission’s website. Those Alerts are written with 
charity and the general public in mind, but some cross reference other guidance 
published by the Commission, and signpost other organisations, such as the Information 
Commissioner’s website. 27 Alerts are currently published. No Alerts refer to the 
Governance Codes or the Hallmarks.170 One Alert, in relation to data protection law, 
makes specific reference to the Fundraising Code.171 
4.3 The Commission as regulator: Reports 
The objectives for the Commission set out in the Charities Act 2011 include the 
promotion of compliance by charity trustees with their legal obligations in managing 
charities and the promotion of public trust and confidence in the sector.172 The 
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Commission operates a risk based framework173 (subject to a review process at the time 
of writing) so that the Commission intervenes when it has the most effective impact. 
The Commission is granted information gathering powers, including the power to obtain 
search warrants,174 and to require delivery of documentation.175 
When the Commission has concerns about a trustee or a charity it will use the risk 
framework to decide whether or not to intervene, and if intervention is justified, what 
type of intervention is required. It may decide not to take any action. Since the 
Commission does not publish its rationale for not taking action in relation to any specific 
circumstance, it is not possible to take a view on whether the Governance Code has had 
any effect on intervention decisions.  
The Commission may decide to investigate by way of an operational compliance case, 
which is not treated as a formal investigation, but rather as an opportunity for the 
Commission to conclude its work by providing advice or an action plan to the relevant 
trustees. Those types of outcomes are only published by the Commission in exceptional 
circumstances. Reports are shown on the Commission’s website for approximately two 
years before being archived.176 Of the 25 reports that are currently published,177 the 
following three are the only reports that make specific reference to the Governance 
Code or the Fundraising Code:178 
Our Brave Heroes – 16 March 2017:179 The Commission received complaints from 
members of the public that fundraising statements made by the organisation described 
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it as being a charity, although it was not registered with the Commission. Concerns about 
the governance of the organisation were noted, and the Commission provided ‘firm, 
detailed advice about the reforms to its governance’.180 Despite raising these 
governance concerns, the Commission makes no reference to the Governance Code, nor 
the Hallmarks, but does make reference to the Fundraising Code. 
Presidents Club Charitable Trust – 12 July 2018:181 The media reported allegations of 
harassment of female staff by attendees of a fundraising dinner. The Commission found 
that the trustees did not take into account the Fundraising Code’s guidance that trustees 
should ensure that ‘the charity operates responsibly and ethically, in line with its own 
aims and values’182 but makes no reference to the Governance Code. 
Imamia Mission London (UK) – 5 September 2018:183 Following allegations of rigged 
elections and an improper sale of the charity’s London property, the Commission 
investigated and concluded that the trustees had exposed the charity to undue risk, 
could improve their accountability, and had failed to act in accordance with the 
principles of good decision making. The Commission recommended that trustees should 
act in a proper and appropriate manner and makes a reference to the Governance Code 
as promoting ‘the principles of openness and accountability’.184 
To put this in context, for just one year, the Commission reports that ‘serious failings in 
trusteeship or governance featured in approximately two thirds of our 2,615 assessment 
cases’185 but sees fit to refer to the Governance Code in only one published Report. 
Given the number of governance failures identified by the Commission, such a low 
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number of Governance Code references supports the thesis that the Governance Codes 
have made little impact.  
4.4 The Commission as regulator: Inquiries 
For higher risk cases, the Commission may ‘institute inquiries with regard to charities or 
a particular charity or class of charities, either generally or for particular purposes’.186 
Once a section 46 statutory inquiry has been instigated, the Commission is granted 
protective powers, including the power to: 
• Suspend or remove any person from their charitable duties; 
• Appoint interim managers or additional trustees; 
• To restrict transactions, freeze accounts or vest property in the Official Custodian 
for Charities; 
• Order any action (or order any action to stop) with the Commission considers 
expedient; and 
• Wind up the charity.187 
Once an inquiry has been concluded, the Commission may (but is not obliged to) publish 
an inquiry report. A link to any published inquiry report appears on the charity’s entry 
in the Commission’s published database of charities but only if accessed using its main 
search function, and not the beta search function188 for at least six months,189 and on 
the Commission’s list of inquiry reports for approximately two years before being 
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archived.190 81 inquiry reports are currently published,191 all of which set out some form 
of governance failure. The following are the only inquiry reports that make specific 
reference to the Governance Code or the Fundraising Code or other codes of conduct.192 
Human Aid UK – 3 March 2017:193 Concerns were raised in relation to a planned event 
at which speakers with controversial or extremist views were due to take part. The 
Commission opened an inquiry to examine the financial management of the charity, and 
whether the trustees had complied with their duties. The Commission concluded that 
the charity had not ‘exercised sufficient oversight of its work with partners’ and there 
was ‘an overall lack of adequate documentation to evidence the charity’s due diligence 
and monitoring of the end use of all the charity’s funds’ which amounted to 
mismanagement.194 The Commission refers to the Fundraising Code in relation to 
working with volunteers. 
The Veterans Charity – 10 September 2018:195 The police informed the Commission that 
four people connected with the charity, including one trustee, had been arrested due to 
concerns about fundraising activities. The Commission concluded that there had been 
mismanagement in the administration of the charity with evidence of ‘poor governance 
and poor financial management’.196 The Commission noted that the charity’s fundraising 
processes were ‘inconsistent with the Code of Fundraising Practice and fell below the 
standards expected by the Commission’.197 
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Ghulam Mustafa Trust – 7 March 2019:198 Members of the public had complained to 
the Commission that the charity’s Facebook page contained offensive content. The 
Commission concluded that the charity ‘had no governance infrastructure in place or 
other policies or controls to assist the trustees’.199 The Commission required the 
trustees (amongst other actions) to review its social media posts and remove any that 
may affect their charity’s reputation, and to draft, approve and implement a trustee 
code of conduct. Despite making such an order, the Commission makes no reference to 
the Governance Code.  
Oxfam GB – 11 June 2019:200 Safeguarding concerns were raised about the charity’s 
work, including in Haiti in 2010. The Commission launched a two-part inquiry, one 
related to the allegations of wrongdoing of Oxfam’s staff in Haiti, and the second had a 
wider safeguarding remit. The Inquiry found that ‘Unlike some other organisations at 
the time, Oxfam GB did have a code of conduct in place that made it clear that 
harassment, intimidation and exploitation was prohibited…’201 The Inquiry also found 
that some ‘material facts were not disclosed or explained about the breadth and full 
nature of the breaches of the code of conduct and misconduct investigations.202 The 
Commission concluded that the ‘charity’s governance and culture with regard to 
safeguarding has repeatedly fallen below standards expected and failed to meet 
promises made’.203 An independent review team recommended changes to Oxfam GB’s 
code of conduct in relation to safeguarding,204 but made no reference to the Governance 
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Code. The Commission’s handling of this inquiry has been criticised and its findings 
called into doubt.205 
Birmingham Diocesan Trust – 03 September 2019:206 Safeguarding concerns were 
raised by the Roman Catholic Church’s independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, 
which selected the charity as a case study in May 2016. The charity’s own audit, and the 
Commission’s inquiry raised serious concerns with the charity’s safeguarding policies, 
procedures and governance arrangements. The Commission found failings in relation to 
the charity’s safeguarding oversight and governance, which meant that individuals had 
not been protected adequately. The Commission ordered the charity to follow the 
Catholic Safeguarding Advisory Service policies and procedures; implement quality 
assurance processes and management and reporting systems; and to improve the 
delivery of training and support and response to any future allegations. Despite finding 
inadequate governance arrangements, no reference is made to the Governance Code. 
Grove Mountain – 20 September 2019:207 The Commission found that the charity was 
not operating for exclusively charitable purposes and the trustees failed to keep records, 
make annual returns and operate robust financial controls. All four trustees were 
removed from office, and an interim manager was appointed by the Commission who 
wound up the organisation. The Commission makes reference to its guidance on internal 
financial controls and to its trustee guidance, but not the Governance Codes. 
Aid and Peace Trust – 30 September 2019:208 The Commission found that although the 
charity’s objects were to advance education in Bangladesh, the trustees were unable to 
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demonstrate that its activities were within its charitable objective and failed to file 
annual returns or manage conflicts of interest. The Commission makes reference to its 
own trustee guidance, but not the Governance Codes. 
4.5 The Commission as regulator: Interim Managers 
As Commission also has power to appoint an Interim Manager to act in stead of the 
trustees of a charity after opening a statutory inquiry under the Charities Act 2011,209 
provided that the Commission is of the view that there has been misconduct or 
mismanagement, or to protect the charity’s assets. This took place, for example, in 
relation to Grove Mountain referred to above. The Commission publishes a list of Interim 
Managers that are appointed to charities at any one time.210 The list contains a note of 
the reasons for the appointments but does not expand on the governance issues that 
are set out in its Inquiry reports. 
4.6 The Commission and Official Warnings 
In December 2013 the National Audit Office published reports questioning the 
Commission's effectiveness as a regulator generally211 and its specific handling of its 
failings relating to The Cup Trust.212 The NAO concluded that the Commission was slow 
to react and reluctant to use its enforcement powers, which had damaged public 
confidence in it as a regulator. 
In part as a response to those criticisms, the power to issue official warnings was granted 
to the Commission by the 2006 Act,213 which came into effect on 1 November 2016.214 
Warnings can be issued to individuals or charities if the Commission considers a breach 
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of trust or duty, or other misconduct or mismanagement has taken place. Warnings 
therefore should be expected to deal with matters that touch on matters of governance. 
In the Commission’s guidance on warnings, it states that it will decide whether to publish 
the warnings on a case by case basis, using the same principles it applies to other 
regulatory publications. If it chooses to publish, it will normally do so on the gov.uk 
website.215 No list of official warnings is published, but details may be included in the 
Commission’s published case reports, or Inquiry reports. The first published official 
warning216 was given in July 2017 to the National Hereditary Breast Cancer Helpline after 
it had failed to comply with the Commission’s action plan. The Commission published a 
case report setting out the background of its concerns.217 The report states that the 
‘warning specifies the actions the Commission considers the charity needs to take to 
resolve the outstanding [sic] and prevent further breaches’.218 The actual warning is not 
published. The case report refers to other Commission guidance, but not any of the 
Governance Codes. 
Of the 25 Case Reports published on the Commission’s website, only the report referred 
to above contained a reference to an official warning being given. A review of 
Commission press releases resulted in a further eight published official warnings being 
identified.219  
One of those eight was issued to the RSPCA on 20 August 2018. It is unusual in that the 
warning itself is published.220 The warning refers to failures of the board of trustees, and 
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in particular the officers of the board and sets out the action that should be taken, 
including an instruction that the board ‘must adhere to the charity’s code of conduct’. 
Another published official warning, addressed to Marc Blanchette personally on 6 
February 2019.221 Mr Blanchette was a trustee of the charity, Expectations UK. Here, the 
expected action to be taken by the charity’s trustees included a governance review. A 
third, addressed seven trustees of the Khatme Nubuwwat Centre charity published on 
19 February 2019 appeared on the charity’s details on the Commission’s website222 (but 
not the beta version). This warning relates solely to the submission of annual accounts 
on time. A fourth, addressed to Oxfam dated 7 June 2019, also appears on the charity’s 
details on the Commission’s website223 (the website mistakenly refers to two official 
warnings). In this instance, the Commission does not list any required action, instead 
choosing to reserve its position for future regulatory action. A fifth, to four trustees of 
The Islamic Educational Society of Blackburn,224 refers to changes required to accounting 
and financial procedures. 
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The last Case Report of note relates to a warning to The Institute of Economic Affairs 
issued by the Commission on 5th February 2019, but withdrawn in June 2019.225 This is 
the only recorded instance of an official warning being withdrawn. 
None of the press releases or published warnings contain references to the Governance 
Code. 
4.7 The Commission and trustee disqualification 
The Charities Act 2011 also grants the Commission a discretionary power to make 
disqualification orders, banning individuals or organisations from being a charity trustee 
for all charities, specified charities or a class of charity for a period of up to fifteen 
years.226 The Commission does not publish a list of disqualification orders, but instead 
publishes an online register of all persons who have been removed as a charity trustee 
either by the Commission or by an order of the High Court since 01 February 1993.227 
The register is only searchable by surname, and does not provide any details of the 
order, other than the date it was issued. It is therefore not possible to comment further 
as to whether disqualification orders reference the Governance Codes or not.  
4.8 The Commission and annual reports and accounts 
The Commission published between May 2014 and December 2018 a series of reports 
in relation to its accounts monitoring reviews.228 The reports contain research findings 
and recommendations relating to the sector’s accounting and reporting. None 
contained any reference to any of the codes of conduct. 
 
225 ‘Official Warning Under Section 75A of the Charities Act 2011’ (The Commission, 
undated). <assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/815720/Official_Warning_Institute_of_Economic_Affair
s_June_2019.pdf> accessed 25 August 2019. 
226 Charities Act 2011, s 181A. 
227 ‘Why some individuals can’t act as charity trustees’ (The Commission, 1 April 2013) 
<www.gov.uk/guidance/charity-trustee-disqualification> accessed 25 August 2019. 
228 ‘Charity accounts monitoring reviews’ (The Commission, 6 August 2014) 
<www.gov.uk/government/collections/accounts-monitoring-charity-commission> 
accessed 25 August 2019. 
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Since September 2008 the Commission has also published annual reports on its own 
work to ‘prevent, detect and tackle wrongdoing and harm in charities and promote 
charity law’.229 They are now entitled ‘Dealing with wrongdoing and harm’, and were 
previously known as ‘Tackling abuse and mismanagement’. The Commission specifically 
states that: 
Each report includes links to relevant guidance for charities. Trustees should use 
the reports to reflect on, and where necessary, improve their charities’ 
governance to ensure that serious non-compliance does not occur.230 
Of the eleven231 that are available from the Commission’s website, the Fundraising Code 
is referred to five times, and the Hallmarks are referred to once every year between 
2012 and 2016. The Commission’s endorsement of the Governance Code is referred to 
in the 2017 report. The format of the annual report changes over the period, and the 
most dramatic change takes place in the last report, published 29 January 2019, in which 
governance is only mentioned in passing when referring to the duty of trustees to report 
serious incidents to the Commission.  
4.9 The Fundraising Regulator 
Fundraising activities for the charitable sector have been the subject of separate codes 
of practice since at least 2006, when the Fundraising Standards Board (FRSB) was 
established as the self-regulator for the sector.232 It created a voluntary scheme for its 
members, but it was criticised for being underfunded and its sanctions being 
ineffective.233 Its role was replaced by the creation of The Fundraising Regulator, a 
private company limited by guarantee, which became the self-regulatory body for all 
charitable fundraising that takes place in the United Kingdom, with responsibility for the 
 
229 ‘Dealing with wrongdoing and harm in charities’ (The Commission, 9 September 
2008) <www.gov.uk/government/collections/tackling-abuse-and-mismanagement-in-
charities> accessed 25 August 2019. 
230 ibid. 
231 ibid accessed 30 September 2019. 
232 Sir Stuart Etherington, Lord Leigh of Hurley, Baroness Pitkeathley and Lord Wallace 
of Saltaire, Regulating Fundraising for the Future: Trust in charities, confidence in 
fundraising regulation (NCVO 2015) 22. 
233 ibid 8. 
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publication of the Fundraising Code.234 As a non-statutory body, funded by the sector, it 
also has limited resources and sanctions. It has entered into memoranda of 
understanding with the Commission, the Information Commissioner and others.235 
If it believes an organisation is in breach of the Fundraising Code it may make a referral 
to the Commission. The Fundraising Regulator indicates that it will refer fundraising 
complaints to the Commission that demonstrate evidence of serious concerns about 
trustee conduct, which might include significantly poor governance.236 
The latest edition of the Fundraising Code makes reference to the responsibilities of 
charities and those who govern them.237 It makes specific reference to the Governance 
Code as a source of guidance on a trustee’s duty to act in the best interests of their 
charity at all times.238 In Section Two of the Fundraising Code it sets out a charity board’s 
general duties, as well as the specific duties relating to risk assessments, dealing with 
donations, handling complaints, payment of fundraisers, disclosures for public 
collections, use of donated funds, and accounting and reporting. 
The decisions made by the now defunct FRSB are no longer publicly available.239 Since 
the Fundraising Regulator has been in existence, it has received 1793 complaints,240 
which led to the publication of 21 investigation summaries, which have since been 
removed from its website. Those investigation summaries did not name the 
organisations being investigated. Four investigation reports241 and ten new style 
 
234 Fundraising Regulator, Code of Fundraising Practice (6 June 2019). 
235 ‘about us’ (Fundraising Regulator, undated) <www.fundraisingregulator.org.uk/ 
more-from-us/about-us> accessed 17 August 2019. 
236 ‘Memorandum of Understanding: Charity Commission and the Fundraising 
Regulator’ (Fundraising Regulator and The Commission, 7 July 2016) 21 
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/memorandum-of-understanding-charity-
commission-and-the-fundraising-standards-board> accessed 17 August 2019. 
237 Code of Fundraising Practice (n 234) 13. 
238 ibid. 
239 <www.FRSB.org.uk> accessed 18 August 2019. 
240 ‘Our Impact’ (Fundraising Regulator, undated) <www.fundraisingregulator.org.uk/ 
more-from-us/our-impact> accessed 30 September 2019. 
241 Listed in Appendix F at page 122. 
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investigation summaries242 have also been published.243 The new style investigation 
summaries name the organisation being investigated. The details of the investigation 
reports and the investigation summaries do not appear in its directory of members 
(which highlights whether the organisation has paid a voluntary levy to the Fundraising 
Regulator), but rather are published in date order in its resource library. Taking each of 
the investigation reports in turn:244 
Neet Feet Limited - 24 November 2016.245 Following allegations in the media of 
inappropriate behaviour on the part of a commercial fundraising company, the 
Fundraising Regulator instigated an investigation. Eight charities had contracted with 
Neet Feet Limited for the provision of their services, and seven were criticised for failing 
to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the company was complying with the 
Fundraising Code. The Regulator’s decision makes reference to the Fundraising Code 
and the Charity Commission guidance on fundraising, and recommends improvements 
to the oversight of such service, and changes to the Fundraising Code. 
Brain Tumour Research - 12 July 2018.246 A complaint was made by two members of the 
public that this charity published false statements on its website whilst fundraising. In 
reaching its decision that the charity did not fully address the complaint, and that some 
of its fundraising material could have been misunderstood. The Regulator’s decision 
refers to the Fundraising Code only. It recommends that the charity ‘considers the 
learning from this complaint’ and that the charity’s annual report which is published on 
the Commission’s database should be duplicated on the charity’s website. No 
governance issues are addressed. 
 
242 Listed in Appendix G at page 123. 
243 ‘Resource library’ (Fundraising Regulator, undated) <www.fundraisingregulator. 
org.uk/more-from-us/resources> accessed 18 August 2019. 
244 Each report searched for key terms ‘governance’ ‘code’ and ‘hallmark’. 
245 ‘Decision: Neet Feet Ltd and eight charities’ (Fundraising Regulator, 24 November 
2016) <www.fundraisingregulator.org.uk/more-from-us/resources/decision-neet-feet-
ltd-and-eight-charities> accessed 18 August 2019. 
246 ‘Decision: Brain Tumour Research’ (Fundraising Regulator, 12 July 2018) 
<www.fundraisingregulator.org.uk/more-from-us/resources/decision-brain-tumour-
research> accessed 28 August 2019. 
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The President’s Club Charitable Trust - 13 July 2018.247 Following allegations in the 
media of inappropriate behaviour on the part of some guests at a fundraising event, the 
Fundraising Regulator instigated an investigation. The Regulator’s decision makes 
reference to the Fundraising Code and the Charity Commission guidance on fundraising, 
but makes no specific recommendations at all. 
International Liberty Association - 07 February 2019.248 The Fundraising Regulator 
received complaints relating to the charity’s volunteers who made home visits to 
members of the public. The Regulator criticised the trustees for failing to monitor the 
work of fundraisers adequately and a failing to deal with the public’s concerns in a timely 
manner. The Regulator required a follow up report in May 2019 (not published at the 
date of writing) and made recommendations for improvement. Despite identifying ‘a 
systemic problem within the charity both in relation to fundraising and governance’249 
no recommendation was made to follow the Governance Code, nor any report made to 
the Charity Commission. 
Only Brain Tumour Research paid a levy to the Fundraising Regulator, and none of the 
others have registered with the Fundraising Regulator.250  
Of the ten new style investigation summaries, nine different charities are citied, four 
being found to be in breach of the Fundraising Code.251 The summaries do not specify 
which section of the Fundraising Code has been breached, instead setting out broad 
‘code themes’. It is therefore not possible to conclude whether any of the charities 
 
247 ‘Decision: The President’s Club Charitable Trust’ (Fundraising Regulator, 13 July 
2018) <www.fundraisingregulator.org.uk/more-from-us/resources/decision-
presidents-club-charitable-trust> accessed 18 August 2019. 
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249 ibid para 47. 
250 <www.fundraisingregulator.org.uk/directory> accessed 18 August 2019. 
251 <fundraisingregulator.org.uk/more-from-us/resources/type/investigation-
62/type/investigation-summary-65> accessed 30 September 2019. 
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identified in the summaries are found to be in breach of any of the Fundraising Code’s 
principles that relate specifically to governance. 
No details of the Fundraising Regulator’s decisions appear on the Charity Commission 
public database, which leads to a conclusion that the Commission do not view the 
breaches of governance as meriting further action. 
4.10 The Information Commissioner’s Office 
The Information Commissioner (ICO) is a corporation sole appointed by government 
under the Data Protection Act 2018 and the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to 
regulate personal data252 and public access to official information.253 Charities are not 
normally public bodies, and therefore the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 
do not normally apply to the sector. However, the Information Commissioner has power 
to issue Enforcement Notices against bodies including charities if any of the data 
protection principles have been breached.254 Failure to comply with an Enforcement 
Notice is an offence, which could lead to a compliance order255 or a financial penalty.256 
The ICO’s remit is wider than the charity sector, but its powers are of special concern to 
charities, especially those using personal data for fundraising purposes.  
To date, fifteen charities have been the subject of a civil monetary penalty,257 and one 
charity worker has been prosecuted for sending sensitive personal data to her own 
personal email account without authorisation.258 Since 2015, the ICO has published 
three overview reports on the charity and voluntary sector, and undertaken 25 advisory 
 
252 Data Protection Act 2018, s 115. 
253 Freedom of Information Act 2000, s 50. 
254 Data Protection Act 2018, s 149. 
255 Data Protection Act 2018, s 167. 
256 Data Protection Act 2018, s 155. 
257 ‘Action we’ve taken’ (ICO, undated) <ico.org.uk/action-weve-taken/> accessed 30 
September 2019. 
258 ‘Jeannette Baines’ (ICO, 6 June 2019) <ico.org.uk/action-weve-
taken/enforcement/jeannette-baines/> accessed 17 August 2019. 
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visits, one of which the author was involved with.259 The details of advisory visits are not 
publicly published. Of the three overview reports, the last, published in April 2018260 
makes special reference to governance arrangements. The eight charities reviewed 
were praised for having clear ‘governance structures in place with delegated 
responsibility from the board down’.261 However, the ICO noted a lack of documented 
information management processes within their overall governance frameworks, and 
limited key performance indicators.262 
The ICO refers to accountability as being one of the key data protection principles 
enshrined in the Data Protection Act 2018, because it is necessary to comply and 
demonstrate compliance.263 It could be said that accountability is also a key principle in 
governance. Principle 7 of the Governance Code suggests that ‘The board leads the 
organisation in being transparent and accountable’. It follows that if a charity wishes to 
follow the Governance Code, then, at least in relation to information management, it 
must comply with its legal duties under the Data Protection Act, but also its trustees 
must take note of the ICO’s guidance on how to be accountable. 
Given the seriousness of the penalties levied by the ICO, and the arrangements between 
the ICO and the Commission to share information,264 it comes as some surprise that 
none of the fined charities were subject to inquiry by the Commission. It would seem 
that information governance breaches leading to fines of up to £200,000 do not merit 
further action by the Commission. 
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4.11 HMRC and the Fit and Proper Person test 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) is a non-ministerial department 
responsible, for amongst other matters, administering charity tax reliefs. It is therefore 
not a regulator per se, but it has statutory powers to grant or withhold tax reliefs to 
charitable organisations, and funders and corporate supporters often rely on HMRC’s 
recognition of an organisation as charitable, especially if the organisation is not required 
to register with the Commission. For example, Microsoft offers cheaper licenses for its 
products if an organisation is able to provide a Commission Registration number or an 
HMRC registration number.265 
The Finance Act 2010 introduced a statutory definition of charities entitled to charity tax 
reliefs following the extension of UK charitable tax reliefs to bodies equivalent to 
charities and community amateur sports clubs in Europe.266 Under this Act, a charity (for 
tax purposes) must be established for charitable purposes only; and must fulfil a 
jurisdiction condition, a registration condition and a management condition. All 
conditions other than the last are similar to the requirements set out in the Charities Act 
2011. The management condition is met if the charity’s managers are ‘fit and proper 
persons to be managers’.267 This phrase is not defined, and therefore takes its natural 
meaning. The test applies to ‘managers’ who may be trustees, but may also be others 
who have ‘general control and management over the running of the charity or the 
application of its assets’.268 
HMRC assumes that all people appointed by charities are fit and proper persons unless 
it holds information to show otherwise. Charities may also assume that their appointed 
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managers are fit and proper persons if appropriate due diligence has been completed 
and HMRC has not made any further enquiries.269 
Although there is obvious overlap between the requirements of the Commission and of 
HMRC: 
… it doesn’t necessarily follow that individuals who are considered by a charity 
regulator to be suitable to act as trustees of charities will always be considered to 
be fit and proper persons for the purposes of the management condition. This is 
because different charity regulators have different responsibilities and priorities 
from those of HMRC and therefore carry out different sorts of checks on trustees. 
Also, HMRC has access to certain information that isn’t available to charity 
regulators.270 
If a manager is involved in fraud, relating to tax, misrepresentation, identity theft or 
otherwise (and regardless of whether convicted of fraud or not), HMRC could reach a 
conclusion that a manager is not a fit and proper person. Such a conclusion could lead 
to a charity losing tax relief, which in turn could be a breach of the trustees’ duties to 
protect their charities assets (since the payment of tax would be an improper use of a 
charity’s assets). 
HMRC makes no reference to governance in general or the Governance Code specifically 
in its guidance on the fit and proper persons test. Yet its test is clearly a mechanism for 
governance: it defines some people as being unfit to govern charities. HMRC does not 
publish its decisions to deem a person as being unfit, nor its decisions to remove tax 
reliefs from charities, so it is difficult to consider the impact of the test on governance 
in the sector. 
The Governance Code does not refer to the fit and proper test, but the 2017 Code’s 
Principle 3 (Integrity) refers to maintaining the charity’s reputation, expecting trustees 
to ‘adopt and adhere to a suitable code of conduct that sets out expected standards of 
probity and behaviour’.271 
 
269 ibid Introduction. 
270 ibid What the fit and proper persons test is about. 
271 2017 Code, (n 17) 12. 
 63 
4.12 Conclusion 
Despite having a role in regulating the governance of charities, all of the bodies referred 
to in this chapter fail to have a comprehensive publication protocol for their 
interventions, which could prevent stakeholders and trustees from being aware of 
governance issues or obligations. Despite memoranda of understanding between the 
regulators, there is little evidence of cross referrals being made, or the Commission 
taking action when charities are found to be wanting by the other regulators.  
References to the Governance Code are scarce, and do not seem to follow any logical 
pattern, despite the number of compliance cases being handled by the regulators. How 
the Commission takes note of the Governance Code appears to be different to the 
Fundraising Code, which introduces a level of uncertainty which is not justified. 
Lastly, the language used by the regulators is not consistent, which references being 
made to abuse, breach of duty, breach of trust, harm, misconduct, mismanagement, 
cultural issues and wrongdoing. This may be a response by the regulators to their own 
powers (especially in the case of the Commission, whose powers are defined in statute) 
but could lead to uncertainty as to which duty or obligation applies in any one case, and 
whether governance arrangements are seen to be important or sufficient in each 
instance. 
Having reviewed the relationship of the regulators to the Governance Code, the impact 
on case law is considered. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE GOVERNANCE CODE AND CASE LAW 
5.1 Introduction 
Governance matters are justiciable in the courts of England and Wales. In considering 
the relevant reported cases, a distinction must be drawn between disputes between a 
charity and third parties (such as suppliers or employees or beneficiaries) which are 
treated by the courts in the same way as any other commercial dispute, and those that 
arise relating the internal management or governance of the charity itself. The latter are 
known as ‘charity proceedings’ and are considered below. 
5.2 Court cases and charitable proceedings 
Since at least 1812, it has been possible to petition the courts using a summary 
procedure to seek determination of simple questions arising in the administration of a 
charitable trust.272 To combat a growing trend of using charitable funds for litigation 
relating to charity governance, controls were introduced by parliament:273 
to prevent charities from frittering away money subject to charitable trusts in 
pursuing litigation relating to internal disputes.274 
These petitions are known as ‘charity proceedings’, a phrase that is used in the 
Charitable Trusts Act 1853,275 since repealed, and now defined as: 
proceedings in any court in England or Wales brought under the court’s 
jurisdiction with respect to charities, or brought under the court’s jurisdiction with 
respect to trusts in relation to the administration of a trust for charitable 
purposes.276 
Charity proceedings may only be taken by the charity itself, or by any of its trustees, or 
any other person if they have an interest in the charity.277 Other than the Commission 
itself and the Attorney General, no other person may bring charity proceedings without 
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the consent of the Commission278 or a High Court judge.279 Consent will only be granted 
if there is a legitimate interest to be heard, which is not frivolous or unfounded, which 
cannot be resolved by the Commission itself but is in the best interests of the charity for 
the case to proceed.280 If the Commission refuses to make an order, an applicant may 
apply to the court to authorise the proceedings before the matter can proceed.281  
A filter is not unique to charity proceedings. For example, the charity proceedings filter 
is referred to in a case282 considering the effect of the Mental Health Act’s provision283 
that requires the leave of the High Court to bring proceedings. 
The Commission does not publish its decisions relating to the granting of consent for 
charity proceedings, and there is no court structure that deals only with charity disputes 
in the same way that, for example, there is a Technology and Construction Court to hear 
disputes about buildings, engineering and surveying.  
It therefore follows that, for as long as there has been a Governance Code, any court 
case that is concerned with the governance or administration of the charity can only 
have been brought by the Attorney General, or the Commission, or with the consent of 
the Commission or a High Court judge. All cases are assigned to the Chancery Division of 
the High Court.284  
A search of all reported cases heard in the Chancery Division of the High Court, Court of 
Appeal and Supreme Court from 01 January 2005 has been undertaken using Westlaw 
UK, Lexis Library, Practical Law, Lawtel and Bailii. Results of those searches have been 
cross checked against cases referred to in the main charity law reference textbooks and 
journals. What follows is an analysis of those cases that refer to charity proceedings, or 
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the relevant statutory provisions relating to charity proceedings or the Commission 
giving leave for a case to proceed. 
A second search was also undertaken to review any cases that are not charity 
proceedings, but refer to the Governance Codes or other charity codes of practice, 
including the Hallmarks. 
5.3 Cases that are not charity proceedings 
In Khaira v Grewal,285 members of a Sikh community in Swindon claimed that the 
trustees of their charity were in breach of their duties and sought relief. Both the 
claimants and the defendants were aware of the charity’s constitution, which included 
a disciplinary procedure, and both had been in correspondence with the Commission. 
Both were willing to submit to a mediation process. The Commission had not granted 
consent for the charity proceedings, but had not, at the date of the hearing, refused. It 
was held that until such time as consent was either granted or refused, the matter could 
not proceed before the court. The court was of the view that it ‘would be in everyone’s 
best interest if the Charity Commission were to take a speedy decision’.286 No reference 
is made to the Governance Codes, nor any other source of guidance for the trustees, 
but the court expressed a hope that the parties would submit to mediation without 
delay. In expressing such a hope, an opportunity to encourage the trustees to refer to 
the available governance guidance was not taken up. 
In Freund v Feldman,287 members of a Jewish Hasidic community in London dispersed to 
worship in five synagogues and disputed the ownership of buildings originally purchased 
to expand the original community’s school. When those buildings were put up for sale, 
the claimants, representing one of those five synagogues, attempted to stop the sale on 
the basis they had an interest in the properties. The court held that the claimed failed 
because the claimants were not the representatives of the original community, but 
rather one of the five dispersed communities, and that any claim against the new 
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owners of the buildings, being a charity, would also fail because Commission consent 
had not been obtained for any charity proceedings to take place. No reference is made 
to the Governance Codes, nor any other source of guidance for the trustees. The 
trustees of the original community were able to continue to manage the buildings (or 
the proceeds of sale of the properties) as they originally intended. No criticism is made 
of those original trustees, and their governance of the charity. 
Similarly, in Barron v Herefordshire CC,288 Mr Barron’s claim that the County Council, as 
sole trustee of the Buchanan Trust, had acted unfairly, inequitably and unlawfully; in 
error; wrongfully, and in breach of trust289 was treated as charity proceedings, but struck 
out for failure to obtain Commission or the court’s consent. The reason for a 
requirement to obtain Commission consent is stated as providing: 
… what has been called “a protective filter” to protect charities from being 
harassed by a multiplicity of hopeless challenges. The question of whether consent 
should be given is therefore of significance and the requirement is not to be taken 
lightly.290 
Given the very small number of charity proceedings, it could be argued that charities are 
being overprotected, and the standards of governance have become lax given the low 
likelihood of any challenge. In any event, the court went on to consider whether it would 
be appropriate to stay the proceedings to allow consent for charity proceedings to be 
obtained, but decided that there was ‘no real prospect of Mr Barron establishing that 
the Trustees acted in breach of trust’.291 Despite finding against the claimant, the court 
expressed a hope that the parties may find a way of reaching a negotiated settlement. 
The boundaries of charity proceedings were also discussed in R on the application of 
London Borough of Brent v FED 2000.292 Here, the Local Authority wished to enforce 
obligations arising under education standards legislation against two charities, and the 
courts were asked whether the Commission’s consent was required. It was held that the 
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claim did not amount to charity proceedings, because the proceedings ‘have been 
brought not in order to challenge the administration of a trust, but to bring a public law 
challenge’.293 In another case, the court held that a claim did not amount to charity 
proceedings because there was no charity.294 
Other proceedings brought by members of a charity were found not to be charity 
proceedings, because they had no financial interest in the charity and therefore lacked 
any standing to apply for relief,295 and if proceedings are brought by only one local 
inhabitant, then the dispute cannot be charity proceedings for the lack of a second local 
inhabitant.296 297 
5.4 Cases when the Commission refuses consent for charity proceedings 
A decision by the Commission to deal with a governance issue under its own powers 
rather than consent to charity proceedings was considered in Seray-Wurie v The Charity 
Commissioners for England and Wales.298 Here, Dr Seray-Wurie requested a declaration 
that he was a trustee of the East End Citizens Advice Bureau, a charitable company. His 
position was unclear because the charity had not followed the procedure for retirement 
by rotation of the trustees set out in the three versions of its articles of association that 
had been adopted during the period in question. The Commission proposed to use their 
powers299 to authorise a general meeting at which the trustees could stand for election, 
and the membership of the board would be certain, at least until the next time a trustee 
retires under the retirement by rotation provisions. The Commission refused consent 
for charity proceedings on the basis that it was their opinion that the case ‘can be dealt 
with by them under the powers of this Act’.300 The claimant applied to the court for 
leave to bring proceedings. However, the court took the view that the Commission’s 
refusal was to enable ‘a practical solution to be found which avoids the need for court 
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proceedings. Court proceedings are likely to be drawn-out and expensive. There is an 
obvious public interest in avoiding the unnecessary expenditure of charitable funds’.301 
No reference is made to the Governance Codes, nor any other source of guidance for 
the trustees. The court refused to allow the case to proceed as charity proceedings. The 
Claimant later made a claim against the Commission for defamation, which he also 
lost.302 This case shows the court’s reluctance to intervene on matters that can be dealt 
with by the Commission, which is seen to provide a more cost-effective method of 
resolving governance matters.  
Whether the courts should intervene when the Commission refuses consent under the 
Charities Act 2011 was considered in Rai v Charity Commission for England and Wales.303 
The court held that it was not acting ‘as an appellate court against the decision of the 
Charity Commissioners: it is exercising its own jurisdiction’.304 This follows the wording 
of the Act, which makes it clear that charity proceedings can progress with either the 
consent of the Commission, or leave from the High Court.305 The matter before the High 
Court is therefore a new application, not a review of the Commission’s refusal. However, 
if the matter is a new application, there is an inherent risk that the application made to 
the Commission is repeated before the courts, increasing costs and the time taken to 
reach a resolution. The court makes the point that it should see the same evidence as 
presented to the Commission, else the court would be making ‘a less informed decision 
than that has already been made’.306 However, the court is not ignorant of the 
Commission’s decision, which will be afforded ‘an appropriate degree of respect 
because of the weight of expertise brought to bear on evaluating what is obviously a 
multi-factorial decision’.307 
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There is also a risk, acknowledged by the court, that the application becomes a ‘dress 
rehearsal’308 for the final hearing. The application process is designed to help prevent 
the resources of charities being depleted unnecessarily and in this case, it is estimated 
that at least £150,000 of charitable funds would be expended on resolving the 
dispute.309 The courts are familiar with applications for leave to proceed with cases (for 
example, when considering leave to appeal), and so this filtering process is in line with 
the court’s other work. However, the court holds in this case that the test should be: 
… is the commencement of litigation the best (or the least worst) course in the 
interests of the charity as a whole to deal with the dispute? Litigation may be the 
best course for the Applicants to pursue to achieve their objective. But it is the 
charity’s interest (not that of the Applicants or proposed Respondents) that is the 
focus of the inquiry.310 
This seems to indicate that the courts will use a very fine filter on cases before them: 
litigation must be the very best course for the charity. It therefore comes as no surprise 
that the number of charity proceedings considered by the courts since 2005 is very 
small. If the court’s oversight of charitable governance is so sparingly available to 
applicants, then it follows that the Commission’s role, and, perhaps, the Governance 
Code’s part in encouraging good governance, becomes of greater importance as a more 
readily available check and balance on the activities of trustees. 
In this case, the court held that, given some contentious points had been agreed 
between the parties, there was a ‘significant chance that an accommodation can be 
reached upon those [remaining] differences which does not involve the expensive 
prosecution of the present proceedings’.311 The application for permission was 
adjourned for two months to allow further time for agreement to be reached between 
the parties. It later transpired that mediation had not resolved the dispute, and leave 
was granted for the case to be heard.312 
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It is also clear that charity proceedings can relate to disputes between a charity and third 
parties, as long as the third party is a ‘person interested in the charity’ despite the phrase 
lacking definition in the Charities Act.313 Here, a composer made an application to a 
music charity to promote his work, and to include his work in the charity’s archive of 
emerging and established composers. When the charity refused to do so, he raised a 
complaint. The Commission refused permission for him to bring charity proceedings. 
The court, despite holding that the claimant was a person interested in the charity,314 
agreed with the Commission, because his complaint was of a private not public 
nature.315 The court held that the claim was not legally sustainable, in part because the 
court costs would ‘exhaust the assets of the Charity and prevent it from achieving its 
charitable objectives’316 and that there was an alternative resolution in the form of a 
public statement on the charity’s website. 
Disputes can also arise when new board members disagree with the actions taken by 
previous board members. In Garcha v Charity Commission for England and Wales317 the 
courts decided that a costs dispute would not amount to charity proceedings because it 
was ‘not the least unsatisfactory way of resolving the dispute’.318 The case report gives 
no indication of the court’s view on what would amount to be a more satisfactory 
resolution. 
Some indication of the time it takes for the Commission to consider applications for 
consent for charity proceedings is given in Singh v Charity Commission for England and 
Wales.319 Following a disputed election of officers to a management committee of a Sikh 
temple, a complaint was made to the Commission. The Commission decided that the 
election was indeed invalid, and the claimants sought Commission consent for charity 
proceedings to challenge the election’s validity. Rather than waiting for consent, the 
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claimants launched court proceedings in October 2015. The Commission refused 
consent in March 2016, but not before injunctive relief had been granted by the court, 
and the claimants had served notice of discontinuance. In the interim period, legal costs 
had been expended, and it was necessary for the courts to consider what should happen 
to the proceedings, and the injunctive relief, given the Commission’s refusal. The 
defendants were given four weeks to file a counterclaim and seek Commission consent 
for the proceedings to continue. The failure of governance, especially financial 
governance is clear from the case report, and some, if not all of the legal costs could 
have been saved with a swift review of the Commission’s view (later retracted) as to the 
invalidity of the disputed elections.  
5.5 Cases that amount to charity proceedings 
A costs recovery case320 heard in 2005 refers to the Commission giving consent to charity 
proceedings for a dispute between a charitable school and its managing governor. When 
the £697,000 claim was abandoned by the charity, which choose to accept an offer of 
settlement of £5000, it was accepted by the charity’s counsel that it would have been 
very unlikely that the Commission would have granted consent if the original claim had 
been made at the settlement figure.321 With the charity’s costs being reported as being 
£170,000322 the need for a cost effective way of dealing with governance disputes is 
clear. 
The first reported charity proceedings case that was decided after the publication of the 
2005 Code was Bukhari v Shah.323 Here, the charity runs a mosque in London. The 
claimants requested declarations that they were the lawfully elected members of the 
trust board, and the defendants counterclaimed for a declaration that others were the 
trustees. Permission was granted for the counterclaim to be charity proceedings, but 
permission for the claim to be similarly treated had not been given. The court therefore 
struck out the claim for want of proper authorisation, and dealt with the counterclaim, 
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which since it too sought a declaration as to who should properly be regarded as the 
charity trustees covered the same ground.324 However, since this case only concerns an 
application for summary judgment, which was not granted, the details of the 
governance dispute was not considered. No reference is made to the Governance 
Codes, nor any other source of guidance for the trustees.  
A similar dispute as to which of two groups should be properly seen to be the trustees 
of a charity was heard in December 2006.325 Here the court ordered a member’s meeting 
rather than settle the dispute itself, with consideration of unconditional mediation.326 
The court also helpfully set out ways of addressing the conflict of interest issues being 
faced by the charity, but made no reference to the Governance Code: 
An obvious example is by achieving a balance of membership, and governance, 
that includes independent membership, and membership of other stakeholders, 
alongside membership of tenants. And by appropriate rules and arrangements to 
ensure transparency and avoid, for example, a tenant with a financial interest in a 
particular decision of the Company having a say in that decision.327  
The first full case to be decided in the period relevant to this thesis does not take place 
until June 2009.328 Two actions were heard concerning a dispute between the members 
of the congregation of the Russian Orthodox Cathedral in London (one relating to the 
London Parish, the other the London Diocese). Resolutions were passed at meetings of 
the relevant governing bodies following a split in the congregation that took place in the 
Spring of 2006. The dispute concerned the use of property and assets by the Parish and 
Diocese in accordance with the terms of two trust deeds. The Commission consented to 
both charity proceedings in October 2007329 and the matter came before the court for 
trial in February 2009.330 The court heard evidence relating to the changes of the make 
up of the parish and those persons worshipping at the Cathedral, with one section 
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leaving to worship elsewhere. The matter turned on whether the valuable assets of the 
charity should follow the worshippers or should remain with the parish for the use of 
new parishioners. It was held that the latter was the correct interpretation.  
This case highlights the length of time that a case can take to be heard by the courts, 
and the breadth of circumstances that can be classed as charity proceedings. As has 
been seen in other cases, the Commission can be reluctant to intervene, and when it 
does intervene, it can issue its own orders to deal with the dispute at hand. Here, it 
chooses to allow the dispute to proceed to court when it could have considered, for 
example, making a reference to an expert or arbitrator as to the proper meaning of the 
relevant provisions in the trust deeds. The court did not make any comment on the 
governance of the charity at all, since once the construction of the trust deed was 
settled, the governance arrangements for the trustees became clear. 
A similar dispute331 turned on whether one of the claimants was qualified to exercise a 
power conferred by the constitution of two charities to remove the defendants as 
trustees and replace them with other claimants. The Court of Appeal held that the: 
… resolution of that issue depends on the religious beliefs and practices of Sikhs in 
general and the Nirmal Kutia Sikh institution in particular. The issue is not 
justiciable by the English courts. This does not depend solely on the construction 
of the trust deeds governed by English Law… The continuation of these 
proceedings will only inflict on them and their communities further waste of time 
and money in the fruitless pursuit of a judicial determination that cannot be made. 
Voluntary procedures are available through mediators, including specialists in 
disputes involving religious charities. Legal procedures may also be available 
through the scheme-making statutory powers of the Charity Commission. The 
present litigation has no realistic future in the courts and must be brought to a 
halt now.332 
This may indicate a reluctance of the courts to specifically be involved in charity cases, 
or perhaps religious charity cases. Lord Justice Mummery sets out alternative dispute 
resolution procedures which would equally apply to other cases. No reference is made 
to the Governance Code as a framework for resolution of governance matters, and it 
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could be argued that the Governance Code is too generic to be of much assistance when 
dealing with matters of faith. However, the Supreme Court, on hearing the appeal, held 
that the dispute did not depend on the claimant’s religious beliefs, but rather could be 
decided under standard trust law and contract law. The Supreme Court held that the 
charity proceedings should be allowed to proceed to trial but gave no indication on how 
the matter in dispute should be decided, referring the matter back to the High Court. 
After five years, the matter was settled (and not appealed) in a decision made by the 
High Court in March 2017, which found in favour of the claimants.333 
In contrast, the court seems to have had no hesitation in deciding matters raised as 
charity proceedings for another faith based registered charity334 in 2012. Despite the 
Commission approving the charity’s constitution on registration, and its meeting both 
claimants and defendants, the dispute between them escalated. The claimant applied 
for permission to commence charity proceedings, but the Commission refused. An 
application was made to the High Court, which was granted. The claimants then 
requested that the Commission appoint interim managers, which it did. The court was 
asked to consider whether the charity’s governing document was the original 
constitution, or whether subsequent drafts had been approved by its membership and 
should supersede prior versions. The court held that the original constitution should 
apply to the charity and reminded all parties: 
Nothing is to be gained, and much is to be lost, not merely to the Charity but for 
all Alevis by continuing the state of war within the community which has existed 
since May 2009.335 
The Commission had set out its view on the matter in a letter to all parties, and the 
court’s decision concurred with the Commission’s view that the original constitution 
applied to the charity. It therefore appears that, although the charity proceedings were 
not a formal appeal by the claimants against the Commission’s view, that is what it 
became: the claimants did not concur with the Commission’s view, applied for 
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permission to take the matter to court, and when the Commission refused consent, took 
the matter to court in any event. This would seem to be an example of the fine filter 
that the courts profess to apply to such cases failing to prevent one faction within a 
charity from extending a ‘state of war’ for years.  
In some instances, the courts will proceed to deal with a dispute, even if Commission 
consent has not been sought, and without any preliminary filter being considered as to 
whether the proceedings should be allowed.336 
Cases before the courts also include those brought by interpleaders. For example, 
Southampton City Council brought a claim because it wanted to know to whom it should 
convey land under a building agreement.337 Here, two rival trusts were of the view that 
each was the correct party to take control of the Southampton Medina Mosque land 
and buildings. It is not clear from the report of the case whether the Commission’s 
consent was given to charity proceedings, or to a declaration in relation to a disposition 
of the land held on trust under a building agreement.338 The court noted the lack of 
proper minutes and records of the trust, which contributed to the disagreements, and 
which seem to have contributed to the doubt as to who represented the organisation 
that was due to receive the land from the Council. That lack of transparency, regardless 
of the basis of the case, must be seen to be a failure of governance, and the Governance 
Code would have been relevant to the discussions before the court. 
The lack of clarity in the case report as to the involvement of the Commission, and the 
relevant statutory provisions, means that there is a lack of transparency and certainty 
in relation to reported charity proceedings. It is not possible to tell from a review of the 
case reports whether cases such as this are governance disputes relating to the 
administration of the charity, or a dispute with a third party about a charity’s 
transactions with a third party (in this case, Southampton City Council). 
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That lack of clarity is also found in Re Commonwealth Institute339 where liquidators 
raised a number of administrative issues relating to the distribution of assets. These can 
be seen as governance issues and some relate to the disposal of land. The Attorney 
General and the Commission declined to take part in the court proceedings. It seems 
that the liquidators, as managers of the charity’s assets, did not see themselves as 
subject to the charity proceedings filter, nor did the Commission see fit to intervene.  
It is clear that charity proceedings can relate to disputes between a charity’s 
membership and its trustees. In one case340 relating to the members of a charity that 
provides and manages a Sikh temple in Leicester, a dispute arose as to whether an 
invalid resolution purportedly passed by the members should be deemed to be binding 
on the trustees. A rule revision purported to change the time period after which existing 
memberships must be renewed, and the management of the admission of new 
members was alleged to have been faulty, in that 1200 new members were admitted, 
despite conditions of membership not being fulfilled. The court held that the revision 
had not been made in accordance with the charity’s constitution, and that there was no 
estoppel or other reason that would mean that the proposed rule change should 
automatically apply in the future, when the charity’s governing document already 
contains a mechanism for future review. It also held that, in the absence of allegations 
of impropriety, then the decision of the trustees not to draw the attention of 
prospective members to the conditions of membership cannot be challenged by the 
members.341 Despite charity proceedings being defined as dealing with the 
administration of the trust, here the courts declined to regard an administrative matter 
as being relevant to the court, preferring instead for the membership to address the 
matter directly: 
This is all a direct challenge, in my judgment, to the administrative arrangements 
that have been made by the defendants, and, in my judgment, is impermissible in 
the absence of an allegation of impropriety. If there is a criticism to be made, it is 
one that can be addressed by the amendment of the scheme that serves to set 
out prescriptively things like the language in which notices are to be given, and 
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advertisements and the terms of the forms that are to be used by the persons 
applying for membership. However, that is for the members to address by way of 
an amendment ballot and not for this court at any rate in these proceedings.342 
On appeal343 the court held that it was possible for a court to intervene if the trustees 
have failed in their duty to take reasonable care, thus confirming the extent of the scope 
of charity proceedings to include not just cases of impropriety, but also to cases where 
trustees have acted unreasonably. The meaning of the constitution, and whether the 
purported trustees had been elected properly were considered in a later hearing,344 and 
what action should be taken to cure the defect required yet another judgment.345 
The scope of the proceedings is relevant. It seems that cases can be heard and decided 
upon, and only later deemed to be charity proceedings on appeal.346 It is therefore 
perfectly possible for the courts to consider a dispute relating to a charity’s governance, 
without any consideration of whether the matter has been properly authorised by either 
the Commission or the court. In this case, a disputed election to the Korean Residents 
Society lead to costs orders, which on further consideration by the courts revealed the 
lack of authority for the original proceedings. Although it was common ground between 
the parties that the lack of consent did not mean that the original proceedings were a 
nullity347 it introduces another aspect of uncertainty as to nature of governance 
proceedings before the courts. 
Charity proceedings can also relate to the interpretation of a charity’s constitution and 
whether actions taken are in breach of a constitution’s provisions. In Rai v Ahir348 the 
courts were asked to decide whether newspaper notices relating to elections were 
unconstitutional. The court held that its role was not as an appeal court to decisions 
made by an executive committee if acting clearly and demonstratively within their 
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charity’s rules.349 In Trustees of the Celestial Church of Christ, Edward Street Parish v 
Lawson350 the court was asked to decide what amounted to the charity’s constitution, 
and whether the parochial committee had power to remove a de facto trustee. In 
hearing a preliminary issue in Bisrat v Kebede351 the court held that the proper approach 
is to ‘ascertain what the words used would have meant to a reasonable person who has 
all the background knowledge that would have been available to the parties in the 
situation that they were at the time of the relevant document’.352 A failure to follow 
(even a poorly worded) constitution does not prevent a charity from existing, and its 
trustees from being responsible for its governance:  
Despite the various failures of the charity trustees over many years to comply with 
the [constitution], the [charity] unquestionably exists as a body of members, with 
charitable objectives and with income received and assets held in trust to support 
the carrying out of those objectives. But those failures have led to this prolonged 
and costly dispute between members. It is necessary, therefore, for the good of 
the charity for steps to be taken by the current charity trustees to remedy those 
failures and to consider ways to improve governance in the future to ensure that 
the charity in the future is properly administered in accordance with its objectives. 
That may involve improving and updating the [constitution] or even adopting a 
new constitution and possible even a new legal form.353 
This is the closest recommendation found in the reported cases that the courts make to 
a governance review. 
Where there is doubt as to who are the properly appointed trustees, charity proceedings 
are relevant, and the courts can order interim injunctions before the Commission has 
had an opportunity to review any application for consent for charity proceedings354 and 
enforcement action for any failure to abide by a court injunction.355 356 
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5.6 Governance and charity membership 
All charity structures other than trusts have a membership. The members have ultimate 
control over their charity, with power to appoint and remove trustees, and to alter the 
charity’s constitution. Members of a charitable incorporated organisation must act in 
the best interests of their charity.357 As noted above, there is doubt as to whether the 
same duty exists for other charitable structures. Whether or not the same duty applies 
to members of a charitable company was considered in Children’s Investment Fund 
Foundation (UK) v A-G.358 Here, the court was asked to approve a $360million grant by 
one charity to another, which could be seen to be a payment for loss of office which 
requires the consent of the charity’s members. The Commission approved the case as 
charity proceedings, even though the trustees themselves were not in deadlock and 
were not acting outside of their powers.359 The court considered whether the two 
trustees who were also members should be deprived of their right to consent to the 
payment of the grant due to the potential conflict of interest or due to contractual 
promises made in grant arrangements, and (finding that there were so deprived) 
whether the independent member owed a fiduciary duty to the charity.360 In confirming 
a fiduciary duty, the court took note of the Charities Act 2011 definition of a charity as 
an organisation that ‘falls to be subject to the control of the High Court in the exercise 
of its jurisdiction with respect to charities’361 and its definition of charity trustees as ‘the 
persons having general control and management of the administration of the charity’.362 
Although the court held that members are not charity trustees, it held that they owe a 
fiduciary duty: 
… the members of [the charity] do not stand outside the charity; they are part of 
the administration of the charity, and they cannot lay claim to any private interest 
… It would be contrary to the whole regime established by the increasingly 
prescriptive legislative regime reflected in the Charities Act 2011 if the member of 
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a company such as [the charity] could vote in his own interests or in a manner 
detrimental to the charitable objects of the company.363 
The independent member appealed364 arguing that he was not subject to a fiduciary 
duty, but the Court of Appeal disagreed: 
… a member of [the charity] owes, in our view, a duty corresponding to that 
specifically imposed on members of CIOs by section 220 of the Charities Act 2011. 
In other words, the member must exercise the powers that he has in that capacity 
in the way that he decides, in good faith, would be most likely to further the 
purposes of [the charity].365 
The case is subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.366 
The Governance Codes do not address the obligations of membership, and how a charity 
may wish to address the undoubted duty of a CIO’s member’s fiduciary duty, and the 
presumed duty of a charitable company’s member’s duty. Nor does it distinguish 
between different types of structure for charity (only seeking to distinguish by size). 
5.7 Governance Codes and the Charity Tribunal 
The Charity Tribunal hears appeals from decisions made by the Commission. Cases that 
may be heard by the Charity Tribunal do not include reviews of whether or not the 
Commission should grant consent to charity proceedings.367 
5.8 Conclusion 
No references to the Governance Codes or the Hallmarks were found in any case report 
within the search parameters. This may be due to the nature of cases that make their 
way to the courts, which, by definition must be those that the trustees and the 
Commission have been unable to resolve informally. It may also be due to the nature of 
disputes heard at court, which relate to more fundamental administration issues, rather 
than the nuances of good practice. It is perhaps surprising that, in considering whether 
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a board has acted appropriately, not one judge has seen fit to use the Hallmarks or the 
Governance Code as a measure of trustee compliance with their fiduciary duties. 
This compares to frequent references to other codes of practice, including professional 
codes such as the Solicitor’s Code of Conduct368 and those of membership 
organisations.369 It also compares unfavourably to the use of the courts of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (previously known as the Combined Code) which sets out 
the obligatory standards of good practice for listed companies on governance 
matters.370  
Even within the charity sector, there is little reference in the relevant reported cases to 
SORPs in relation to the use of an industry standard code of accounting principles. A 
search of reported cases371 found only two references.372 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GOVERNANCE CODE AND REFORMING BODIES 
6.1 Introduction 
In considering how the law may evolve to take account of the Governance Codes, the 
work of the relevant government departments, the House of Parliament’s Select 
Committees and the work of the Law Commission was considered, being the bodies 
most likely to involved in changes in the laws of England and Wales. 
At the time that the 2005 Code was published, the Charities Bill was being debated in 
Parliament. The Cabinet Office was responsible for matters relating to charity law, 
including the progress of the bill in both houses. In 2010, responsibility passed to a new 
post in the Cabinet Office, the Minister for Civil Society.373 In 2016, responsibility moved 
to the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (as the department is now 
known) with the creation of a Parliamentary Under Secretary for Civil Society. The post 
is currently held by Baroness Barran MBE374 who is in charge of the Office for Civil 
Society. One of her responsibilities is to ‘enable a strong regulatory environment with a 
capable and well-resourced Charity Commission in place’.375 
Select Committees work in both of the United Kingdom’s House of Parliament. There is 
a Commons Select Committee for each government department tasked with examining 
spending, policies and administration. Other Select Committees (of both houses) have 
remits that cover more than one department’s work, or narrow scopes to focus on a 
specific area of concern. 
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6.2 The Cabinet Office 
The 2006 Act required (at section 73) for the Secretary of State (then, the Minister for 
the Cabinet Office) to appoint a person to undertake a review of the Act, who must 
prepare a written report to be laid before parliament. The review was to report on the 
operation and effectiveness of the Act, and to consider whether any further changes 
should be made to improve the legal and regulatory framework for charities.376 Lord 
Hodgson of Astley Abbots was appointed as Reviewer on 8 November 2011, and his 
report was published in July 2012.377 The 2006 Act was unusual in including a mechanism 
for review.378 
As noted above, the Governance Codes are not mentioned in the 2006 Act. That may 
have been a factor of timing: The Act, although passed in 2006, was drafted in 2004, 
based on a review that took place well before the first iteration of the Governance Code 
was created. However, it comes as a surprise that the Report only mentions governance 
of charities once,379 and no recommendations are made in relation to governance 
arrangements for charities. 
Lord Hodgson is clear that all charities must comply with the law, and that they should 
also ‘provide enough information for the public to be able to decide whether to support 
them’.380 Transparency is a recognised tenet for governance, and features in all versions 
of the Governance Code. It can also be seen in some of the provisions of the 2006 Act, 
including making charity annual accounts and reports available to the public on 
request.381 
However, the Report goes further: 
But perhaps the privilege of being a charity involves a more demanding and less 
easily defined duty … charity trustees have a moral responsibility to put the assets 
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and income raised to pursue their objectives to the best use that is reasonably 
possible rather than settling for minimum compliance … anecdotal evidence 
suggests that there are a considerable number of moribund and semi moribund 
charities whose assets could be more productively deployed.382 
Lord Hodgson therefore sees the aspects of leadership and governance of charities, or 
at least the obligation to make the best use of a charity’s assets, to be a moral 
responsibility. He warns of the risk of political micro-management and the need for 
charities to be seen to be independent, recommending a clear, flexible regulatory 
framework and effective guidance.383 
The Report sets out the duties of charity trustees in a similar manner as has been 
discussed above. Hodson chooses to set out a general duty to act in the best interests 
of a charity (and its beneficiaries), and five broad duties: 
1 Ensuring the charity complies with charity law, the charity’s own governing 
document, and other relevant legislation (e.g. employment law, health and 
safety etc); 
2 Acting with integrity, avoiding conflicts of interest and misuse of funds; 
3 Ensuring the charity remains solvent, and exercising prudence when 
investing the charity’s money or borrowing on its behalf; 
4 Using the charity’s funds and assets responsibly to further the charity’s aims, 
without exposing them to undue risk; 
5 Using reasonable care and skill in their work, seeking professional advice 
where appropriate.384 
The Report focuses on the potential risks of conflicts of interest in allowing payments 
for trustees, recommending that, by default, small charities should only be allowed to 
pay their trustees with the consent of the Commission, and the default reversed for 
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large charities, presumably on the basis that larger charities will have the resources to 
comply with clear disclosure requirements.385 
The Report also refers on the recruitment and term of office for trustees.386 Having set 
out specific reasons for good governance, Hodson does not recommend the adoption of 
a Governance Code, but does suggest that the Commission could publish key indicators 
to identify charities at higher risk of failure to meet legal obligations.387 That 
recommendation has not been taken up, perhaps because of the difficulty of expressing 
all of the legal obligations of charities, and deciding on the indicators of failure. It could 
be argued that, since good governance should reduce the risk of failure, a requirement 
to comply with a concise governance code could well assist to put this recommendation 
into effect. 
The government responded to the Hodgson Report in September 2013. It did not accept 
the recommendation to allow larger charities to pay their trustees. The government 
undertook to review progress and to respond by September 2014.388 That review, led 
by PWC reported in 2014 and made recommendations that the fundraising regulators 
should work closer together.389 
The Cabinet Office also undertook a specific review of charitable fundraising, announced 
in July 2015. Sir Stuart Etherington was appointed to chair a cross party review group 
and was tasked to make recommendations on the workings of the sector’s self-
regulation of fundraising. Most of the recommendations set out in his report relate to 
the work of the fundraising regulators, rather than the work of charity trustees.390 
However, in considering the responsibilities of trustees and CEOs, reference is made to 
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the Commission’s guidance on charities and fundraising, but not to the Governance 
Code.391 
6.3 Select Committees 
Following publication of the Hodgson Report in July 2012, the Public Administration 
Select Committee (PASC) announced its intention to conduct an inquiry into the 2006 
Act and four additional specific areas of concern.392 The PASC published its report in 
June 2013.393 
Although governance is a subject regularly discussed in the evidence the PASC heard, it 
is a word that is not used at all in its 2013 Report. That said, two sections of its report 
address governance concerns: fundraising and payment to trustees. In relation to the 
former, PASC recommends that no action be taken in relation to the statutory regulation 
of fundraising394 preferring to support the sector supported self-regulation, at least for 
a five-year period. In relation to the latter, PASC concluded that there should not be an 
automatic right for large charities to pay trustees, but rather to continue with the 
current case by case authorisation by the Commission.395 
The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (PACAC) launched an 
inquiry to examine the regulation of charity fundraising and the way that trustees of 
large charities govern fundraising. It published its report in January 2016.396 In common 
with the Etherington Review, PACAC were concerned about allegations made in the 
press that the sub-contractors of national charities were using exploitative and unethical 
fundraising methods. The Report concluded that charity trustees had ‘failed in their duty 
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to extend their governance to fundraising, particularly in the management of sub-
contractors’.397 PACAC’s Report recognises that: 
Trustees are ultimately responsible for every aspect of their charity’s activity, 
including fundraising. No system of regulation can be a substitute for effective 
governance by trustees. Good governance in general is about sustainability of 
reputation in the long-term, as well as the sustainability of finances… Trustees 
must have the right skills, information and attitude to prevent poor practice in the 
future.398 
As would be expected of a report into fundraising, no specific mention of the 
Governance Codes is made, but many references are made to the Fundraising Code. At 
the time of the public outcry (May 2015) both a version of the Governance Code and the 
separate fundraising code existed, but yet the failures in governance still occurred. The 
Report states that trustees failed to understand that ‘their primary role is governance’ 
and failed to therefore manage reputational risk.399  
The 2010 Code, at Principal 4, makes it clear that the trustees must ensure that the 
organisation understands and complies with all legal and regulatory requirements that 
apply to it, and that the use of delegated authority is properly supervised. However, 
PACAC’s Report goes on to say that: 
All the chief executives of the charities that gave oral evidence to us admitted that 
they did not scrutinise fundraising sub-contractors enough. The only possible 
conclusion is that, by failing in this responsibility, trustees were either negligent, 
or wilfully blind to what was being done in their names.400 
Here, the Report seems, to some extent, to confuse leadership and governance. A 
trustee is unable to take action if those who are charged with the day to day operation 
of a charity fail to fulfil their role. An alternative conclusion may well be that trustees 
delegated the responsibility of fundraising to their chief executives, but their chief 
executives (and their teams) failed to manage that delegated authority properly. In any 
event, the Report did not recommend that the Governance Code (or any other code) be 
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adopted by trustees, or that the Governance Code, or any other code should be altered 
to take account of the perceived failings. Instead, the Report recommended that: 
…trustees need to take positive action to ensure that they are not blind to their 
charity’s fundraising activity … It is vital that these changes are effective so that 
trustees can have confidence in the methods and ethics of fundraising conducted 
on their behalf, whether by employees, volunteers or by contractors.401 
To some extent, the same can be said for any charity’s scheme of delegation for any 
matter. The risks may not have been especially evident with fundraising contracts given 
the speed of change of the marketplace, and especially the availability of new 
technologies to harvest and use personal data. The 2017 Code reflects that overall 
requirement by recommending at para 4.5.4: 
Where a charity uses third party suppliers or services – for example for fundraising, 
data management or other purposes – the board assures itself that this work is 
carried out in the interests of the charity and in line with its values and the 
agreement between the charity and supplier. 
In February 2016, PACAC published another relevant report, which was instigated by the 
collapse of the charity, Keeping Kids Company402 (also known as Kids Company). At this 
time, the 2010 Code was widely available, and yet this Report does not refer to it at all. 
Instead the Report refers to Charity Commission guidance when considering the failure 
of the trustees: 
The Charity Commission’s guidance to Trustees warns that Trustees should not 
allow their judgement to be swayed by personal prejudices or dominant 
personalities, but this is what occurred in Kids Company … There was a clear link 
between the failure to correct serious weaknesses in the organisation, and the 
failure to refresh its leadership.403 
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Failure to act in the best interests of the charity, and a failure to maintain a strategy for 
board renewal are both breaches of the 2017 Code404 and yet this is not highlighted by 
the Report. The Commission’s own inquiry is yet to conclude its work, pending ongoing 
litigation. 
The latest Report published by a Select Committee is called Stronger charities for a 
stronger society.405 The committee started its work in May 2016 ‘to consider issues 
related to sustaining the charity sector and the challenges of charity governance, and to 
make recommendations’.406 The Report is the first to expressly refer to the Governance 
Code.407 It summarises its history and notes that the code is ‘the de facto standard for 
the sector’.408 The Committee endorses the Commission’s decision to refer to the 
Governance Code as the ‘benchmark for governance in the charity sector’409 and the 
inclusion in the Governance Code of recommendations for appropriately resourced 
inductions for all new trustees.410 
The Report also notes that the Governance Code proposes that trustees should be 
appointed for fixed terms, and that no trustee should serve for more than nine years 
without board review.411 The Commission is tasked with updating its model 
constitutions to include a suggestion of time limits. At the time of writing, this has not 
been done. 
The Committee also recommends that the Governance Code sets out the ‘importance 
of executive and trustee relationships and the clear separation of their roles and 
responsibilities’.412 Although the latest edition does provide guidance on the supervision 
of a charity’s executive, no specific mention is made of the recommended clear 
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separation of the two roles. The 2017 Code recommends in its introduction that 
charities should publish a statement relating to their use of the Governance Code, which 
was also a recommendation of the Committee,413 and that (as per Principle 7 
recommended practice) charities should provide regular information to stakeholders to 
enable third parties to measure the charity’s success.414 The Report does not go as far 
as recommending that charities are obliged to follow the Governance Code, but by 
including the Governance Code in its considerations, and referencing it in some of its 
recommendations, the Committee shows some recognition of its value to the sector. 
6.4 Office for Civil Society 
On 9 August 2018 the Office for Civil Society published the government’s policy paper 
containing its strategy for working with and supporting civil society, a phrase it uses that 
includes the charity sector. The policy contains five chapters, the third of which contains 
information pertinent to charities and social enterprises.415 Although the policy 
document does not refer to the Governance Code itself, it does recognise the 
importance of leadership and governance. It states in the introduction to chapter 3: 
In particular the government is keen to work alongside the social sector to realise 
a future in which organisations are able to adapt and thrive, strengthen public 
trust and find new ways to resource and deliver their missions. This includes all in 
the sector feeling that their voice is respected in policy debates, where there is 
strong support available and ongoing and effective investment in leadership and 
governance.416 
Further, each chapter contains ‘Missions’, as a way to describe future commitments. 
Mission Eight relates to leadership, support and regulation. The government concludes 
that a number of sector led efforts are underway to strengthen governance (one of 
which could be the Governance Code). It commits to two actions: 
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The government will convene key civil society stakeholders over the next year, to 
explore the potential for a common vision and mission for strengthening the 
leadership of social sector organisations and the potential for specific government 
interventions. The government will work with civil society stakeholders and the 
Charity Commission to explore and agree on collective action to open up 
trusteeship to people from different backgrounds and with a broad range of skills, 
and encourage more young people under the age of 30 to become trustees.417 
At the time of writing, there is no public announcement from the government 
concerning the convening those stakeholders. In correspondence with the author, 
DCMS confirms that research has started in the ‘policy area, ascertaining from key 
stakeholders the major challenges in the sector, models that work, barriers to 
development, and future opportunities’.418 
6.5 The National Audit Office 
The National Audit Office is an independent body that scrutinises public spending for 
Parliament. A search of its publications419 found one reference to the Governance Code, 
in relation to its report on the Government’s Motability Scheme.420 The Scheme is run 
by a registered charity, Mobility. The Report compares the average tenure of the 
charity’s trustees of 18 years, with the recommended maximum tenure of nine years in 
the Governance Code.421 Following the review, the charity’s solicitors used the 
Governance Code to benchmark its practice, and the Report records that 44 
recommendations were made to address the issues raised.422 
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6.6 The Law Commission 
The Law Commission is the statutory independent body created by the Law 
Commissions Act 1965 tasked with keeping the law of England and Wales under review 
and to recommend reform. If any further legislation is planned to take account of the 
Governance Code, it is likely to be in response to a Law Commission recommendation. 
The Law Commission has undertaken one review relating to charity law since 2005. It 
resulted in the publication of two papers, the first relating to social investments by 
charities423 and the second covering all other aspects of its review.424 
The first Report makes no reference to the Governance Code, but it does recognise that 
the Law Commission’s proposed new power for trustees to make social investments 
must relate to a trustee’s duties in much the same way as all other duties: 
Accordingly, the power must be exercised in the best interests of the charity, for 
proper purposes, and in accordance with the charity trustees’ fiduciary duties; 
charity trustees must consider the Charity Commission’s guidance on public 
benefit; and charity trustees must not confer unlawful private benefit on third 
parties.425 
Regulations relating to social investments were included by the government in the 2016 
Act. 
The second Report notes the existence of the Governance Code when considering 
whether charities governed by statute or royal charter would benefit from guidance in 
relation to the process of amending their constitutions.426 It also notes that the 
Governance Code recommends that trustees consider the benefits and risks of 
partnership working, merger and dissolution.427 
 
423 Law Commission, Social Investment by Charities: The Law Commission’s 
Recommendations (September 2014). 
424 Law Commission, Technical Issues in Charity Law (Law Com No 375, 2017). 
425 ibid 10. 
426 ibid 96. 
427 ibid 268. 
 94 
Throughout the second Report, the Law Commission refers to a trustee’s fiduciary duty, 
a duty not to profit, to avoid conflicts of interest and to act even-handedly. In neither 
report does the Law Commission recommend any codification of those duties, nor the 
Governance Code, nor its adoption by the sector.  
The government is yet to respond publicly to the second Report. 
6.7 Conclusion 
There have been several opportunities since the publication of the 2005 Code for 
Government, Select Committees and the Law Commission to review its effectiveness 
and usefulness, and whether the Governance Code should become a statutory 
recognised code of practice. None of those opportunities have been taken up. 
However, in referring to the 2017 Code as a benchmark for the sector, a false sense of 
what the Governance Code’s stated purpose may have been created: contrary to the 
previous editions, the current version is couched in terms that are aspirational, with a 
recognition that ‘some elements of the Code will be a stretch for many charities to 
achieve’.428 To refer to an aspirational code as a benchmark may well cause some 
charities to lose faith in the governance of their activities, and cause trustees to fear that 
their fulfilment of their fiduciary duties do not go far enough. 
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CHAPTER 7 THE GOVERNANCE CODE AND THE CHARITY SECTOR 
7.1 Introduction 
Having reviewed the impact of the Governance Codes on the law, this chapter reviews 
the impact of the Governance Codes on the sector, with special reference to recent 
attempts to deal with the Governance Codes’ shortcomings. 
The sector itself is of a broad nature. There are 168,186 charities registered with the 
Commission429 that have a total annual income of approximately £77bn.430 Nearly 40% 
of those registered charities have an annual income of under £10,000, and 1.3% have 
an annual income of £5m or more. Individuals in the United Kingdom support a broad 
range of charitable activities431 including health and disability (25%); religious activities 
(19%); overseas aid and disaster relief (11%); animal welfare (8%); housing (7%); 
activities for young (9%) and old (4%) people; conservation (4%); sports, arts and 
recreation (3%), and education (2%). The Governance Codes therefore address both a 
very broad size of organisation and broad scope of objectives. 
7.2 The Governance Code and annual reports 
Trustees are described by the Commission as its first line of defence against 
mismanagement in charities, with the sector’s auditors and independent examiners 
being the second.432 In its most recent benchmark of charity accounts, the Commission 
found that of the 96 charities sampled with an annual income of over £1m (who are 
subject therefore to full audit), only 76% of the filed accounts met with their external 
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scrutiny benchmark, with the percentage falling to 37% for the 100 charities sampled 
with an annual income of between £25,000 and £250,000 which are subject to 
independent examination.433 Although not named, one sampled charity had appointed 
one of its trustees to complete its independent examination in clear breach of duties.  
It would therefore seem that a significant proportion of those professionals with the 
responsibility of checking financial and governance compliance for charities fail to 
identify breaches of their client’s reports and accounts. In a similar way, recent research 
has shown that almost 96 per cent of declarations by small charities that their accounts 
are ‘qualified’ by their independent examiner or auditor are erroneous.434 
7.3 The prevalence of the Governance Code 
There has been little in the way of published research to measure the take up of the 
Governance Code so far. No peer reviewed research was found in literature searches. 
One small industry study has been published, by auditor RSM.435 It sampled 85 
registered charities with annual incomes in excess of £5m. Since these large charities 
make up less than two per cent of the total number of registered charities,436 and larger 
charities are obliged to engage with auditors to assist with their reporting, it is perhaps 
unwise to extrapolate RSM’s findings to the whole of the sector. Their report shows that 
approximately 44% of the charities analysed acknowledged the Governance Code in 
their annual reports. They also found that 30% of the annual reports failed to outline 
their review processes for executive appointments; 20% of charities had board members 
with unexplained tenures of over nine years; 11% did not disclose senior staff 
remuneration levels, and 78% did not have a diversity statement on their websites.437 
RSM categorises as these failures as being breaches of the Governance Code. 
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Compliance with professional codes of practice, trade associations rules and voluntary 
codes can be indicated to the public by a badge or logo. The Solicitors Regulatory 
Authority, for example, have mandated the use of a digital badge on all regulated firms’ 
websites from November 2019.438 Similarly, the Fundraising Regulator allows those who 
register with the Regulator (as opposed to those who comply with the Fundraising Code) 
to use the fundraising badge to use on websites and fundraising material.439 However, 
use of the fundraising badge is not compulsory, with a 2017 study reporting only 18 of 
the largest 100 charities displaying the badge on their charity’s website’s homepage.440 
A 2019 survey of the public found that only seven per cent of those surveyed were aware 
of the Fundraising Regulator.441 If the Governance Code is to become publicly recognised 
as a tool for good governance, then it too needs greater sector support and a way of 
quickly and easily identifying which charities have adopted it. 
Given the relatively low compliance rates with the Commission’s benchmarks by charity 
auditors and external examiners, there is a risk that the reputation of the sector is 
damaged if Governance Code adoption rates are low, or if those charities who adopt the 
Governance Code report a high failure rate to follow its suggested protocols and 
procedures, or those who audit compliance are not sufficiently skilled in governance 
mechanisms to tell whether or not the Governance Code has been breached.  
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7.4 The Governance Code and ethics 
In the Commission’s most recent report on public trust in charities,442 it concludes that 
charities are trusted less than the average person in the street. The Commission 
reiterates obligations to act ‘to a high standard of compliant and ethical behaviour that 
that the public expects’.443 Of the factors that make charities trusted, its research shows 
that the most important qualities (in decreasing proportions) are low management 
charges, making a difference, honest and ethical fundraising, being well managed and 
being independent.444 Although it could be argued that if a charity is well managed, then 
it will have reasonable management expenses and make a positive difference, the 
research confirms that factors which make a charity trusted by the public include445 
transparency (mean score 8.8) (which could be argued to be an element of good 
governance) and being well governed (mean score 8.3). 
The Commission’s focus on ethical behaviour is shared by NCVO which published a Code 
of Ethics to complement the Governance Code.446 The scope of the Ethics Code includes 
enabling charities ‘…to be a safe place for anyone who comes into contact with them’.447 
Safety is an ethical concern and a moral good, but to what extent a code of ethics can 
practically enable safety is doubtful, which the Code itself acknowledges in stating that 
‘It does not provide a set of rules that prescribe how to act in all situations’.448 
The Ethics Code sets out four principles, and each is briefly described in terms of what 
the charity ‘should’ achieve by following each principle. Further explanation is then 
provided by a set of operational statements that suggest how charities should uphold 
each principle. 
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Given Principle 3 of the 2017 Code requires trustees to act with integrity and be aware 
of the importance of the public’s trust in the sector, the need for a separate ethics code 
may be in doubt. There is a risk that, if there are too many codes, both trustees in 
particular and the public in general may become less willing to recognise the worth of 
code compliance. 
7.5 The Governance Code and the digital age 
In November 2018 a separate Charity Digital Code of Practice was published449 with the 
aim to ‘help charities increase impact, develop skills and improve sustainability’. The 
Digital Code was created in response to an expressed wish for charities to increase their 
digital skills, and to foster a ‘digital first culture where they can raise funds, awareness 
and connections online for the greatest impact’.450 It is designed to complement the 
Governance Code. It sets out seven principles for consideration if a charity wishes to 
develop its digital activity, the first of which, leadership, includes best practice 
statements for small and large charities for governance. Those statements reiterate the 
need for a board to have the relevant skills to understand digital resources, and the risks 
and costs associated with them.  
The Digital Code is therefore more a framework for delivery of digital services and 
activities. It assumes that a charity complies with legal obligations such as data 
protection legislation, rather than creating a framework for observance. By separating 
digital delivery from more traditional methods, the Digital Code may assist a board to 
identify new opportunities and threats, but there is a risk, especially for smaller 
charities, that a focus on digital policies will divert the board away from considering 
charity wide risks. 
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7.6 Beneficiaries and the Governance Code 
The Governance Code was designed for use by charity trustees. As noted above, voting 
members of charities may also have a governance role,451 but the Governance Code 
does not address that role. 
Some charities, including the Terrence Higgins Trust, are considering whether 
governance should also extend to their beneficiaries and how to increase beneficiaries’ 
involvement in the charity’s activities.452 The Governance Code assumes that all duties 
are owed to the beneficiaries, not owed by them. This is in contrast to the Cadbury 
Report, which acknowledges that shareholders have a governance role in appointing 
directors and auditors.453 
7.7 Areas for development of the Governance Code  
Those responsible for the Governance Code have announced that a consultation on 
potential changes to the Governance Code will take place in the autumn of 2019.454 
Their stated areas for change include aligning its provisions with the revised Fundraising 
Code and revised SORP requirements. The review may also consider the benefits of 
considering elements of the Ethics Code referred to above,455 especially in light of 
updated workplace practices following the success of the Me Too movement, the 
recognition of the risk of bullying in the workplace, and the public’s increased awareness 
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of the source of charitable funding, especially in relation to pharmaceuticals456 and 
climate change.457 
7.8 Should the Code be mandatory? 
Another large accountancy practice, Mazars, describes the rate of update for any type 
of volunteer code in any sector as ‘alarmingly low’458 but believes that: 
Mandatory application would create a level playing field, making it possible to 
compare one organisation with another. In this new reality of ongoing scrutiny, it 
is vital, - not just for individual organisations but for the sector as a whole – to 
embrace that scrutiny… Mandatory codes, rules and regulations are the hallmarks 
of any regulated industry.459 
It is possible to make the Governance Code mandatory, in the same way that compliance 
with the SORP is mandatory, and for the Commission to use its benchmarking expertise 
to report on the health of the sector going forward, if there were sufficient impetus 
either within the Government or the Commission.  
7.9 Funders and the Code 
As noted above,460 any organisation seeking public funding for sport and physical activity 
must demonstrate compliance with UK Sport’s Code461 mandatory for funded 
organisations. Other funders seem to rely on the terms and conditions of their grant 
agreements to place specific or bespoke governance conditions on funded charities, 
rather than publish a pre-condition of governance compliance. This piecemeal approach 
 
456 For example, the Sackler Trust: Frances Perraudin and Rupert Neate, ‘Sackler Trust 
halts new philanthropic giving due to opioid lawsuits’ The Guardian (London, 25 March 
2019) <www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/mar/25/sackler-trust-halts-new-
philanthropic-giving-due-to-opioid-crisis-lawsuits> accessed 30 September 2019. 
457 For example, Shell: Nazia Parveen, ‘National Theatre to end Shell membership from 
next year’ The Guardian (London, 4 October 2019) 
<www.theguardian.com/stage/2019/oct/04/national-theatre-to-end-shell-
sponsorship-deal-from-next-year> accessed 04 October 2019. 
458 Aedin Morkan of Mazars Ireland, ‘Is it time to make existing Voluntary Codes 
Mandatory’ (2016) Vol 36 No 5 Accountancy Ireland, 55. 
459 ibid. 
460 Para 2.6. 
461 A Code for Sports Governance (n 81). 
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is likely to increase compliance costs for charities, who may have to report to different 
funders with different compliance requirements. A governance industry standard may 
therefore reduce governance costs overall. 
7.10 Conclusion 
The impact of the Governance Codes on the sector has yet to be measured 
comprehensively, and until a benchmark is achieved, it is difficult to identify whether it 
is of use to trustees and their charities. New schemes have been introduced to address 
perceived shortcomings in the Governance Code, and there is a risk that too many codes 
of practice may reduce the future impact of the Code. 
With public perception of the charity sector in constant flux, it is necessary to find a way 
of expressing a governance code of practice that is sufficiently robust, but flexible. 
Having reviewed the impact of the Governance Codes on the law and on the sector, the 
final chapter reviews the scale of the impact of the Governance Codes to date. 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
The Governance Codes have been published for nearly 15 years, which could be said to 
be too short a period to see a large impact on charity law. However, this research has 
found no reference to the Governance Code in statute or case law. 
The slow response could in part be due to the lack of a bedrock: there remains no 
universal definition of ‘governance’ or ‘trustee duties’. This, in turn may be a function of 
a lack of a defined stakeholder for charities; the absence of a profit driven desire of 
shareholders of commercial companies, or an ambivalence as to whether codification 
of those trustees duties will make a practical difference. 
Over the 15 year period, the focus for good governance has changed, with different 
codes of practice being issued and updated by different authors. That may be evidence 
of a flexible approach to governance, a lack of understanding of its remit, a lack of 
maturity in consideration of how to express governance, or even competition between 
would be market leaders in governance regulation or advice. It leaves the charity trustee 
with a choice of codes of differing length and detail, none of which purport to set out a 
comprehensive framework that will fulfil the relevant legal duties and obligations.  
No charity law statute to date refers to charity governance, or the Governance Codes. It 
could be argued that the statutory position has become less clear during that period 
with the introduction of a new undefined statutory duty for CIO members to act in the 
best interests of their charity. No charity law court case refers to the Governance Code, 
despite other cases making reference to other obligatory and voluntary codes of 
practice. 
The Commission, as the main regulator for the sector has withdrawn its own governance 
code of practice, and has failed to explain any link between its regulatory work and the 
Governance Code. It, in common with the other charity regulators, evidence an 
inconsistent publication of governance related case reports, inquiries and warnings that 
does little to promote good governance in general or the Governance Code in particular. 
Similarly, funders to the sector have no standard approach to governance, with only a 
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very small number promoting good governance by making funding requirements to 
comply with governance codes of conduct. 
Reform in the future, and the adoption of the Governance Code by legislators, regulators 
and practitioners may be harder to achieve with no one body championing it. There is 
no easy way to measure a trustee’s compliance with fiduciary duties over time against 
any of the published charity codes of practice. If anything, adoption and measurement 
is harder now, with the 2017 Code being expressed as an aspirational target, rather than 
a recognised achievable benchmark for the sector. There is no code of practice that 
addressed the potential duties of charity members or the possible involvement of 
charity beneficiaries in good governance practices. 
Until such time that a sector wide benchmark is set, it seems unlikely that there will be 
any mandate to make compliance with the Governance Code mandatory. 
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the Governance Code has made very 
little measurable impact on charity law, and that there are no codes of practice that set 
out a comprehensive framework to assist charity trustees to comply with their legal 
duties and obligations.  
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